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INTRODUCTION
unctional state-like entities are contributing to the shift
of international legal personality from an objective to a
subjective, functional regime. There are numerous situations
where there are entities that, for one reason or another, cannot
or will not be considered states. However, the international
community needs to engage with those same entities in various
functional ways for pragmatic reasons. For the lack of a dis-
tinct legal status for these territorial, quasi-states, the interna-
tional community can only apply the status of statehood. Yet at
the same time, the entity cannot truly be considered a state. As
a result, the entity is treated as if it were a state on a case-by-
case, functional and relative basis, while the international
community continues to refuse it formal statehood. The diffi-
culty with this pragmatic approach is that this treatment ex-
poses relativity in perceptions of statehood and may bring the
objective statehood regime into doubt. This practice in turn
suggests that subjective statehood is increasingly the norm and
that objective statehood is not, or is no longer, correct. This ar-
ticle will survey various ways that quasi-states are being treat-
ed as if they were states and identify emerging norms on func-
tional statehood.
The scholarly consensus is that statehood is an objective in-
ternational legal personality. Hersch Lauterpacht,1 James Bri-
erly,2 and James Crawford3 assert that, if an entity is a state,
then it enjoys personality in its relations with any other inter-
national legal person, notwithstanding recognition or other re-
lations. When an entity enjoys the status of statehood, it does
so objectively and for all purposes; thus, a state’s status is not
subject to fragmentation in different legal regimes.4 These au-
1. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 67
(1947).
2. See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 138 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
3. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
21-22 (2d ed. 2007).
4. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the Inter-
national Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, Fragmen-
tation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, ¶ 183–84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,
F
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thors go so far as to argue that it is “grotesque”5, “seems a vio-
lation of common sense”6 and might violate legal certainty7 to
think otherwise.
On the other hand, Kelsen submitted that statehood was nec-
essarily relative.8 This conclusion is based on his view of the
legal nature of statehood and recognition as a legal interpreta-
tion of facts.9 Although his views are tolerated in the scholar-
ship, the consensus shows they do not generally prevail. Even
so, actual state practice seems to be more tolerant of subjective
statehood than the scholarship on the matter would suggest.
As an example of the critical importance of this evolving
practice, relative statehood is brought into sharp focus by the
Situation in Palestine and the steps being taken by the Prose-
cutor of the International Criminal Court to investigate inter-
national crimes committed by Israeli and Palestinian individu-
als. On December 20, 2019, the Office of the Prosecutor filed a
request pursuant to a ruling from the Pre-Trial Chamber on
the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine.10 The primary
issue in the request is whether Palestine may be treated as if it
were a state.11 Among other conclusions, this article will argue
that it is possible for Palestine to be considered a state under
the Rome Statute and yet also not a state under different trea-
ty regimes or before other international organizations.
This article will begin to construct the evolving legal rules on
quasi-state functional practice and, in so doing, consider
whether the continuing existence of de facto states and regimes
2006) (“These rules and principles include at least those concerning statehood
. . . To press upon a perhaps self-evident point, there is no special ‘WTO rule’
on statehood”). See also Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judg-
ment, 1989 I.C.J Reps. 42, para. 50 (July 20) (concerning the relativity of the
local remedies rule).
5. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 67, 78.
6. CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 22.
7. Id. at 21.
8. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observa-
tions, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605, 609 (1941) (“[T]he legal existence of a state . . .
has a relative character. A state exists legally only in its relations to other
states. There is no such thing as absolute existence.”).
9. See id.
10. See generally Prosecution request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling
on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine, Case No. ICC-01/18
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://
www.un.org/unispal/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/ICCANNEX_201219.pdf.
11. Id.
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forces us to shift our perspective to contemplate an increasingly
subjective, relative nature of statehood itself.12 This article does
not contemplate situations where a quasi-state might be recog-
nized as a state against its will.13 The cases in this study focus
on quasi-states that have sought treatment as a state, at least
for certain purposes. This article will also only consider state-
hood insofar as it is a legal phenomenon. It is certainly much
more. In order to act within the legal sphere and enter into le-
gal relationships, however, a territorial entity needs to be a
state in law. Thus, this article will limit itself to the question of
the legal personality of quasi-state entities and its relation to
objective statehood.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
International legal personality is a fluid concept. The classic
position is that an entity is an international legal person when
it has the capacity to conclude international agreements, con-
duct diplomatic relations, and bring international claims.14 In
the Reparations advisory opinion, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) demanded only two of these capacities: capability
of possessing rights and duties under international law and ca-
pacity to maintain those rights by bringing international
claims15 In essence, these aspects can be reduced to the capaci-
ty for international rights.16
12. This analysis is excluding Kofi Annan’s submissions on the relatively
of sovereignty. See generally U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL, WE THE PEOPLES: THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.N. Sales No. E. 00.I.16
(2000).
13. For a discussion on recognizing an entity as a state against its will, see
D. P. O’Connell, The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem,
50 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 415 (1956).
14. See Christian Domince, La personnalite juridique dans le systeme du
droit des gens, in J. MAKARCZYK, ED., THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRZYSZTOF
SKUBISZEWSKI 147–71 (1996); See also David Feldman, International Person-
ality, RECUEIL DES COURS 358–59 (1985); P.K. Menon, The Subjects of Modern
International Law, HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 30, 84 (1990); CHRISTIAN N. OKEKE,
CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1974).
15. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J 174, 187–88 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations
Advisory Opinion] (concluding that the UN has the capacity to make a claim
against a non-Member State on behalf of an injured agent).
16. See 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, General Rules of the Law of Peace, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 286–87 (E. Lauterpacht, ed. 1970);
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The problem with this view is that it is difficult to speak of
capacity without a person already existing in whom the capaci-
ty is vested. In Reparations, the ICJ first considered whether
the United Nations (UN) was an international legal person pri-
or to analyzing the rights it might have on the international
plane.17 This approach assumes that personality must first be
held to exist and that it brings rights and duties with it.
Strangely, the ICJ then considered whether the UN had cer-
tain rights and duties that necessitated personality, suggesting
that personality was a consequence of rights and duties.18
The better view is that the ICJ looked to the UN’s rights and
duties as evidence of the intention to grant the entity personal-
ity. In this view, the award of rights and duties inherently
brings with it an award of personality. Given the analysis
above that personality is an aspect of rights and duties, enjoy-
ment of state-like rights and duties should mean enjoyment of
statehood for functional purposes. It is quite difficult to main-
tain that where an entity acts as if it were a state, that it is not
a state,19 albeit a state that might be limited to the functions it
can undertake.
The question is then how to recognize which entities exercise
the right functions to have international legal personality, and
which rules of international law bind them. Following the ICJ’s
reasoning in the WHO/Egypt advisory opinion, it would nor-
mally be understood that customary international law should
bind even some non-state actors20 if the actors have the appli-
See also Myres s. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3, 25 (1960). Some authorities
also demand some sort of acknowledgment of the person, see, e.g., ANTHONY
CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 176 (1999).
17. Reparations Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, at 184.
18. See id. at 179.
19. Graeme Wood, Limbo World, FOR. POL’Y (Dec. 18, 2009)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/limbo_world (“These quasi-
states . . . control their own territory and operate at least semifunctional gov-
ernments, yet lack meaningful recognition . . . They start by acting like real
countries, and then hope to become them.”).
20. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the
WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 463, at 73, 89–90, 92–93 (Dec.
20); See also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTORS 65–68 (2006); Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the
Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, 281 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,
135 (1999).
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cable capacity. When it comes to states, however, it is not con-
troversial that they have that capacity and are bound by inter-
national law. The difficulty is when the entity is being treated
as if it was as state, though it is not universally acknowledged
to be a state.
A. Ex Injuria Non Jus Oritur
Subjective statehood cannot be discussed within the context
of the international legal system without also addressing one of
the principal reasons why de jure statehood is frequently re-
fused: ex injuria non jus oritur, the principle that a legal right
cannot arise from an unlawful act.21 The reasons why an entity
might not mature on the international plane are varied. Some
decisions are clearly political, and there is a well-entrenched
political resistance to new states already,22 but other refusals
are necessitated by the obligations of non-interference in do-
mestic affairs or ex injuria. When a state claims territory, or its
personality on the international plane, as a result of the unlaw-
ful use of force or other violation of international law, especial-
ly jus cogens norms such as self-determination and apartheid,23
21. See, e.g., Patel v. Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 (appeal taken from Eng.).
22. Pål Kolstø, The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-
States, 43 J. PEACE RES. 747, 760 (2006) (“the community of recognized states
has . . . been closed at both ends. While no members are thrown out, the en-
trance gate has been strictly guarded and new applicants are routinely
turned away.”); See also DE FACTO STATES: THE QUEST FOR SOVEREIGNTY (To-
zun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann & Henry Srebrink, eds., 2004) (“recognition is
stubbornly withheld even though the realities on the ground themselves ex-
pose the legal fictions which the international community supports in the
defence of the principle of territorial integrity”); Secretary-General’s Press
Conferences in Dakar, Senegal, 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 34, 36 (1970) (“As
far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is
concerned, the United Nations’ attitude is unequivocal. As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and
I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its
Member State.”); Rep. of the Security-General, at ¶ 17, U.N. Doc A/47/277 -
S/24111 (1992) (“if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed state-
hood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and eco-
nomic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.”).
23. See E. Timor Case (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 29
(June 30); See also Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 232 (July 9)
(separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.); JURE VIDMAR, DEMOCRATIC STATEHOOD IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW STATES IN POST-COLD WAR
PRACTICE 42 (2013).
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other states have an obligation not to recognize the new state
or situation.24 This conclusion is obligatory because under the
principle of ex injuria jus non oritur the entity’s claim cannot
exist in law.25 This conclusion is usually operationalized as a
UN decision,26 though such a decision is not required since it
24. Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 38 (July 9) (separate opin-
ion by Higgins, J.); See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 55–
56 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion]; E. Timor Case (Port. v.
Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. at 103–04 (June 30); Int’l Law Comm’n,
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, arts. 40, 41, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001); See also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 421; ROBERT R. LANGER,
SEIZURE OF TERRITORY: STIMSON DOCTRINE AND RELATED PRINCIPLES IN LEGAL
THEORY AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 58 (1947); Enrico Milano, The Non-
recognition of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: Three Different Legal Ap-
proaches and One Unanswered Question, QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. 35 (2014).;
Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situa-
tion, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 683 (James Crawford,
Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson & Kate Parlett, eds., 2010); Stefan Talmon, The
Duty Not to ‘Recognize as Lawful’ a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of
Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation
without Real Substance?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 104, 99–126 (Chris-
tian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006);]; Werner Meng, Stimson
Doctrine, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690
(R. Bernhardt, ed. 1982).
25. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶¶
132–37 (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.); See also Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Proj. (Hung v. Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.ICJ Reps. 7, 54, 78
(Sept. 25); Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 24, at 54–56; LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 1, at 421. For ex turpi causa non oritur actio, seeMil. and Paramil.
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, at 394, ¶ 270 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Schwebel); US Dipl. &
Cons. Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Reps. 53–55, 62–63
(May 24) (dissenting opinion of Morozov & Tarazi); Diversion of Water from
the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28); Id. at
Ser. C, No. 81, para. 240; Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Apr. 5) (dissenting opinion of Anzilotti); Fac-
tory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26);
See also Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Gr. v. UK), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 5 at 50 (Mar. 26); see generally William Thomas Worster, The Effect of
Leaked Information on International Legal Norms, 28 (2) AM. UNIV. INT’L L.
REV. 443 (2013).
26. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶ 6 (Mar. 27, 2014); See also G.A. Res. 3314
(XXIX), ¶ 6, Ann. Art. 6 (Dec.14, 1974) (giving content to the meaning of an
46 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 46:1
derives not from the UN Charter but from general internation-
al law.27 The representative examples of ex injuria are the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), regarding the
unlawful use of force,28 and the apartheid “Bantustans,” re-
garding the principle of self-determination.29 In both cases, one
is left with a de facto entity that may be operating effectively
as a state with nationals and a coherent legal system, yet is
excluded by law from the international legal system. Still, ex
injuria is not itself a jus cogens rule and exceptions exist.30 In
some situations, unlawful acts do not, alone, preclude the en-
joyment of legal rights or the imposition of other legal conclu-
sions. For example, there is a long accepted distinction between
jus ad bellum31 and jus in bello,32 that the lawfulness of the use
of force should not have an effect on the application of interna-
tional humanitarian law,33 notwithstanding the obvious ten-
act of aggression as established in the UN Charter); G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV), ¶
6 (Dec.16, 1970); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
27. See generally G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 26; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
supra note 26; G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV), supra note 26; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)
supra note 26.
28. Anne Peters, Statehood After 1989: ‘Effectivités’ Between Legality and
Virtuality, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUR. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 171, 175
(James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010). The TRNC was created as a
result of the unlawful, unilateral use of force by Turkey to intervene in Cy-
prus and assist in its secession, upon whom it remains dependent. Id.
29. See, e.g., S.C. Res 217, ¶ 3 (Nov. 20, 1965) (“no legal validity” for
Southern Rhodesian declaration of independence). The Bantustans were sep-
arate “homelands” that were set up by South Africa within its territory and
excluded from the South African state as a part of the apartheid policy of
stripping citizenship on a racial basis, though they remained dependent on
South Africa. See generally Anthony A. D’Amato, The Bantustan Proposals
for South-West Africa, 4(2) J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 177 (1966).
30. See infra Sec. III.B.3.
31. See U.N. Charter, arts. 42, 51, ¶ 1 (providing for prohibitions on the
commencement of military operations against another state). See generally
Saul Mendlovitz & Merav Datan, Judge Weeramantry’s Grotian Quest, 7
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 425 (1997).
32. See St Petersburg Declaration, November 29, (1868), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds.,
2000) (providing for limitations on the type of military means and methods
used in armed conflict); See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 77.
33. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 807–08 (4th ed., 1997); Enzo
Canizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello
in the Lebanese War, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 791 (2006); Christopher
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sion.34 In addition, even if the use of use of force is unlawful,
international law may still recognize the legal effects of the
acts, i.e. the existence of a state of armed conflict.35 Similarly,
the destruction of Palmyra by the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL or ISIS) during that armed conflict was an unlaw-
ful act,36 yet its effect in fact and law cannot be refused—it is
still destroyed after all. However, when it comes to statehood,
as a legal status, it is accepted that ex injuria can block recog-
nition of legal personality.
There are drawbacks for failing to treat an entity as a state.
Refusing to recognize personality frees the entity to some de-
gree from responsibility for compliance with international
law,37 even though that entity acts in ways comparable to
statehood.38 Ex injuria in this situation ironically works partly
in the favor of the entity by permitting it to enjoy de facto
statehood (in the sense of local governance, control and the
monopoly on the use of violence) without any of the obligations
of international law. States need to engage with a variety of
actors all over the world, ranging from non-governmental or-
Greenwood, The Relationship between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 REV.
INT’L STUDIES 221, 227 (1983).
34. See Summary Records and Documents of the First Session including
the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, I Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
281, ¶ 18 (1949), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.1(“It was suggested that, war having
been outlawed, the regulation of its conduct had ceased to be relevant. On the
other hand, the opinion was expressed that although the term ‘laws of war’
ought to be discarded, a study of the rules governing use of armed force –
legitimate or illegitimate – might be useful . . . It was considered that if the
Commission . . . were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret
its action as showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the
disposal of the United Nations for maintaining peace”).
35. See Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaf-
firming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
963, 963 (2008).
36. Kareem Shaheen, Palmyra: destruction of ancient temple is a war
crime, says Unesco chief, GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2015)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/palmyra-destruction-
ancient-temple-baal-shamin-war-crime-un-isis (“The chief of the UN’s cultur-
al agency on Monday described Islamic State’s destruction of a Roman temple
in the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra as a ‘war crime.’”).
37. See Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian
Law: Current and Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 63
(2007).
38. See generally YAËL RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
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ganizations (NGOs) to corporations, from billionaire philan-
thropists to secessionist groups, and cannot ignore many con-
tested territorial entities even if they may not normally be con-
sidered states. Historically, there was a very low threshold for
recognition as a state, potentially being implied from almost
any engagement with a territorial-based entity,39 so that states
could more easily identify other entities as such and engage
with them. Now, however, receiving recognition is an almost
impossible task.40 States therefore need to engage with de facto
entities, yet at the same time play the delicate subtle act of
denying statehood. Furthermore, there is a need to maintain
the effectiveness of international law, globalization and cooper-
ation, protect the individuals within the de facto states, or pro-
vide a means for independence though excluded from the inter-
national statehood regime.41 All of these needs necessitate a
39. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (CarrieLyn Guymon, ed., 2013)
(noting that recognition may be implied as “when a [recognizing] state enters
into negotiations with the new state, sends it diplomatic agents, receives such
agents officially, gives exequaturs to its consuls, [and] forms with it conven-
tional relations.”); See also David Gray Adler, The President’s Recognition
Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
133 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George, eds., 1996) (“At international law,
the act of receiving an ambassador of a foreign government entails certain
legal consequences. The reception of an ambassador constitutes a formal
recognition of the sovereignty of the state or government represented.”); 1
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 27, 73 (1906).
However, in contemporary practice, conclusion of a treaty with the relevant
entity can be done without de jure recognition. See, generally., James Ker-
Lindsey, Engagement without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic Interac-
tion with Contested States, 91 INT’L AFF. 1 (2015); see also Linjun Wu, Limita-
tions and Prospects of Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy, in THE INTERNATIONAL
STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS 35, 38–39 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts ed., 1996).
40. See, e.g., Kolstø, supra note 22; DE FACTO STATES: THE QUEST FOR
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 22.
41. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 44 (“Not being a State is to be denied
independent access to those forums that States – themselves or through in-
ternational organizations – still control.”). See also LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., 8th ed., 1955) (observing
that an unrecognized state is considerably constrained in its ability to act
internationally); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third
Geneva Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 131 (2005); Lung-chu Chen, The U.S.-
Taiwan-China Relationship and the Evolution of Taiwan Statehood, OPINIO
JURIS (May 16, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/05/16/the-u-s-taiwan-china-
relationship-and-the-evolution-of-taiwan-statehood/ (last visited Nov. 25,
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practical solution to quasi-statehood, even while refusing de
jure statehood.
Thus, states find themselves in an awkward situation with
an awkward solution: to extend some of the obligations of in-
ternational law to the questionable entity and treat it as if it
were a state for purposes of certain obligations, but not as if it
were a state for other purposes. Treating an entity as if it were
a state for certain purposes is simply a pragmatic solution.42
Thus, even if ex injuria was an absolute principle in theory, the
result is not borne out in law or practice. Quasi-states have
partly grown out of the need to engage with certain entities,
and yet at the same time refuse their personality.
In turn, quasi-states challenge the distinction between enti-
ties that are states and entities that are treated as if they were
2020) (“In the absence of formal diplomatic recognition from most states and
without a seat in the United Nations, Taiwan and its 23 million people are
isolated in the international community. The solution to this injustice cannot
be based only in pure theory or pure politics. The two need to be conjoined in
a workable reality.”); Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST
(Sep. 18, 1999), https://www.economist.com/international/1999/09/16/two-
concepts-of-sovereignty.
42. See, e.g., A Bill to Direct the Secretary of State to Develop a Strategy to
Obtain Observer Status for Taiwan in the International Criminal Police Or-
ganization, and for Other Purposes, Publ. L. No. 114-139, 130 Stat. 313
(2016) (arguing in favor of RO China/Taiwan observer status for pragmatic,
functional reasons, i.e. combatting global crime and effective police coopera-
tion). See also An Act to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to
obtain observer status for Taiwan at the Triennial International Civil Avia-
tion Organization Assembly, Publ. L. 113-17, 127 Stat. 480 (2013); Taiwan
Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of
2019, Pub. L. 116-135, 134 Stat. 278 (2020); Press Release, UNHCHR, Ru-
pert Colville, Spokesperson, Press briefing notes on Palestine, item 4, U.N.
Press Release (May 2, 2014), http://
unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/262AC5B8C25B364585257CCF006C010D
(last visited Nov. 25, 2020)
This accession to seven core human rights treaties [ICCPR,
ICESCR, etc.] and a key protocol is a significant step to-
wards enhancing the promotion and protection of human
rights in Palestine. It is notable in a region with a high
number of reservations to human rights treaties, that Pales-
tine is acceding to eight human rights treaties without mak-
ing a single reservation.
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states for functional purposes.43 This article will discuss below
many cases where the lack of statehood in law, for whatever
reason, was set aside, albeit partially, for certain functional
reasons. This practice does not mean that ex injuria is abol-
ished of course, because it does indeed prevent some entities
from becoming objective states. Instead, ex injuria relegates
certain entities to relative, subjective statehood.
II. RELATIVE PERSONALITY OF NON-STATES
Following from the discussion on how personality is under-
stood in international law, the common thread is one of capaci-
ty and functionality.44 International organizations are the most
obvious entity based on functional existence, but there are also
quasi-international organizations, entities that may be treated
as if they were international organizations depending on their
function, yet not fully considered international organizations as
properly understood.45 In other works, this author has suggest-
ed that whether an entity has international legal personality is
based on functional considerations and that the nature of the
same entity can vary from situation to situation.46 A good ex-
ample are treaty regimes, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, that
have a Conference of States Parties and a secretariat, and can
engage in many functions that demand personality, yet are ex-
plicitly refused personality by the states parties.47 There are
43. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 30 (“No further implications may be
drawn from the existence of legal personality: the extent of the powers, rights
and responsibilities of any entity is to be determined only by examination of
its actual position.”); See generally Van Essen, De Facto Regimes, 28 UTRECHT
J. INT’L EUR. L. 31, 31–49 (2012).
44. See generally William Thomas Worster, Territorial Status Triggering a
Functional Approach to Statehood, 8(1) PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 118 (2020);
See alsoWilliam Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of
Non-State Actors, 42(1) BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 207 (2017).
45. See generally Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-
State Actors, supra note 44, at 240–55, 267–71.
46. See generally id.
47. See generally William Thomas Worster, The Arms Trade Treaty Re-
gime in International Institutional Law, 36 UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L L. 995 (2015);
See also Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Ar-
rangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phe-
nomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623, 625, 631–43, 655, 658
(2000); Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, 68 INT’L
L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 584, 587 (1998) (treaty regimes are “incomplete interna-
tional organizations”).
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also other collective entities, such as corporations and NGOs,
as well as individuals, that similarly enjoy aspects of interna-
tional legal personality depending on how they are functioning
within the international legal order.48 The author has exam-
ined the relative personality of international organizations,
peoples, National Liberation Movements (NLMs), indigenous
peoples, belligerents, de facto entities, private entities, reli-
gious organizations, and the individual.49 Some of these enti-
ties, such as NLMs, indigenous peoples, or insurgents, have
some kind of territorial existence and their personality blurs
into statehood.50 The most obvious of these is the collective tri-
umvirate of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Pal-
estinian Authority (PA) and State of Palestine.51 In each of
these cases, the challenge is to determine whether the entity is
an international legal person, or whether it is merely treated
as if it were an international legal person.
III. RELATIVE STATEHOOD
Keeping in mind the numerous examples above where the
personality of non-state actors was relative based on the func-
tion of the entity concerned, the analysis now turns to the par-
ticular personality of statehood. This author has also assessed
the various types of entities that can claim at least partial and
relative treatment as states.52 That analysis was based on the
territorial status of certain entities that triggered a functional
appreciation. This article begins to unpack the functionalist
treatment.
Insofar as this article compares functionalism for non-states
to functionalism for states, it might be considered unfair to
compare international organizations and other non-states to
states in order to demonstrate relativity. The other entities are,
after all, derived legal persons, not original, organic legal per-
sons like states. Original legal persons might arise from the
48. Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors,
supra note 44, at 240–55, 267–71.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 221–40.
51. William Thomas Worster, The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court over Palestine, 26 (5) AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1153,
1160–62 (2011).
52. See generally Worster, Territorial Status Triggering a Functional Ap-
proach to Statehood, supra note 44.
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historical process as facts yet are still expressions of the ways
in which people engage with each other. States are created by
people in a search of some sort of collective cohesion. Perhaps it
is better to say that states are, in a manner, also derivative
persons, receiving their personality from individuals acting col-
lectively. States are treated as if they were persons by their
constituent public, even while the public participates in the
state.
This author is not alone in taking this approach comparing
functional treatment. The examples cited above of NLMs do not
comfortably follow the rigid distinction between a non-state
and a state actor. NLMs are, in a way, deliberately “incorpo-
rated” as non-state entities and yet later bear the authority for
exercising self-determination and then government. In addi-
tion, Schoiswohl has successfully compared international or-
ganizations and de facto regimes, even though, in the view of
this author, the latter could be characterized as “organic.” In
his view, the key is whether the organization or the regime is
“assuming and administrating functions which bear the capaci-
ty to eventually compromise fundamental rights of individu-
als.”53 It is remarkable that quasi-states, whose statehood
might be relative and for whom a functionally based approach
is so controversial, when it has long been accepted that inter-
national organizations and NLMs might be relative and func-
tionally based, and both of those entities might also govern ter-
ritory and people.54 Even more importantly, practice shows
53. See MICHAEL SCHOISWOHL, STATUS AND (HUMAN RIGHTS) OBLIGATIONS
OF NON-RECOGNIZED DE FACTO REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF
‘SOMALILAND’ 82–88 (2004).
54. See generally James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal
Personality in the 21st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 18 (1997)
(documenting the rise of international and regional organizations as legal
personalities in the twentieth century, and examining potential bases for the
international legal personality of new entities such as “nongovernmental or-
ganizations, multinational corporations and to some extent, subnational gov-
ernments” in the twenty-first century); Cf. David Ettinger, Comment, The
Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 97,
104 (1992) (mentioning that the Olympic Charter has international personal-
ity by virtue of its near universal activities, and that the norms embodies in
the Olympic Charter rise to the level of customary international law) with
Romana Sadurska & C.M. Chinkin, The Collapse of the International Tin
Council: A Case of State Responsibility?, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 845, 845, 856–87
(1990) (describing the creation of the International Tin Council (“ITC”) by
over twenty tin producing and consuming states, and arguing that the ITC
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that many quasi-states are treated as if they were states for
certain purposes. They are not treated as if they were interna-
tional organizations or NLMs; they are treated as if they were
territorially based states with the rights and duties accruing to
states. Further, practice shows that entities may be treated as
states in this way for certain limited, functional purposes with-
out necessarily needing to determine those entities’ interna-
tional legal personality objectively for all purposes.55 For these
reasons, this author is comfortable conducting this analysis of
relative statehood as a form of relative personality, with com-
parison to other non-state actors with relative personality.
The development of case-by-case functional solutions for the
needs of the international community, as discussed above, has,
however, led to an alternate statehood regime—a subjective
regime—that exists alongside the objective regime.56 The ex-
tensive number and lifespan of state-like situations, along with
the general position in international law that legal personality
is functional, raises the question of whether statehood itself, in
and its Member States could be held liable by third party creditors in certain
circumstances). See also William Thomas Worster, The Contribution to Cus-
tomary International Law of Territories under International Administration,
in INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE FORMATION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sufyan Droubi & Jean d'Aspremont, eds.,
2020) (discussing how international organizations contribute to customary
international law when they are governing an international territorial ad-
ministration such as UNTAET or UNMIK).
55. See, e.g., Larsen v Hawaiian Kingdom, Hague Ct. Rep. paras. 9.2-9.4
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001) (observing that the parties “stipulated the continuing
existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom”, so that the tribunal found it unneces-
sary to consider “whether for the purposes of international law the Hawaiian
Kingdom may be regarded as continuing to exist”, yet the tribunal did not
dismiss the case on those grounds); See also Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon,
Commc’n. No. 1134/2002, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002 (U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm. 2005) (observing that the author claimed to be the Fon, or tradi-
tional ruler, of Widikum in Cameroon and the head of the exile government of
“Ambazonia” which was unlawfully annexed by Cameroon in violation of the
right to self-determination and only finding the claim inadmissible as exceed-
ing the competence granted on the Committee by the optional protocol, not
because such a claimed state had no right to self-determination).
56. See, e.g., DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 98 (7th ed., 2010) (describing the status of Belarus and Ukraine as orig-
inal members of the UN as “international persons sui generis”). See also
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (6th ed. 2008) (“[p]ersonality is a
relative phenomenon varying with the circumstances”); Kelsen, supra note 8,
at 609.
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all cases, can also be subjective and functional. Perhaps there
are no objective entities after all. What this article finds is that
personality—indeed, statehood—may no longer be absolute and
objective, but varying and fluctuating.57 This article will not
take up this tempting discussion in its entirety but will only
focus on the subjective statehood of certain entities and their
co-existence with objective statehood. If the thesis of this arti-
cle can be sustained, though, a non-objective theory of state-
hood is potentially the next step.
There are two principal ways in which quasi-states may have
relative statehood: (1) through subjective relationships or (2)
through relative functions. Further, these two considerations
can overlap.
A. Subjective Relationships
The first possibility is that a quasi-state only enjoys personal-
ity vis-à-vis another international actor, such as when another
state recognizes and engages with the quasi-state on the inter-
national plane. This discussion appears to apply the constitu-
tive theory, the theory that states only exist when they are rec-
ognized as states,58 but that is only partly the case. This article
will largely avoid a lengthy analysis of the classic constitu-
57. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 324; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de l’Ordre
Juridique International [The Unity of the International Legal Order], 297-I
RCADI 108–12 (2002); Jonathan I. Charney & J. R. V. Prescott, Resolving
Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 453,
475 (2000) (“[w]hat should be clear is that simplistic conceptions of the inter-
national legal system of the past . . . are not valid today. A non-state entity
may have international legal personality with rights and duties under inter-
national law.”). For an unusual approach, see Eiki Berg & Ene Kuusk, What
Makes Sovereignty a Relative Concept? Empirical Approaches to International
Society, 29 POL. GEOGRAPHY 40–49 (2010)
Sovereignty takes on many forms today . . . the quantifica-
tion of empirical sovereignty would give us a few ways to
compare and contrast the different degrees of internal and
external sovereignty and demonstrate the ‘differences of be-
ing sovereign’ among internationally recognised states, de
facto states, autonomous regions, dependent territories and
governments-in-exile.
58. William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics and the Concept of the State in
State Recognition Theory, 27(1) BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L.J. 115, 118 (2009).
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tive/declaratory question, whether statehood is purely based on
recognition or not,59 as this author has already written on this
topic, and there is an extensive discussion on this debate in the
literature.60 Suffice it to say that the debate can be largely
avoided because of the ways that the two theories often dis-
solve into each other in practice. Where a state may apply the
declaratory theory, there is a need to analyze the Montevideo
criteria,61 and yet, in a decentralized legal system, states might
disagree on whether the factual criteria are met, resulting in,
effectively, the constitutive theory in application. Many schol-
ars, such as Oppenheim and Crawford, have admitted that
there was no consensus on the theoretical basis for state exist-
ence62 and no obligation to recognize the statehood of an enti-
ty.63 If it is accepted that there is no duty to accord interna-
tional rights and duties in bilateral relationships, it must be
contemplated that there will be some bilateral relationships
where one actor is not treated as a state in law by the other ac-
tor,64 regardless of the underlying facts. Thus, whether under
59. See id. See also Conf. on Yugoslavia Arb. Comm’n [“Badinter
Comm’n”], 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494, 1521–23, 1525–26 (1992) (“[T]he effects of
recognition by other States are purely declaratory.”).
60. See id.
61. The Montevideo criteria is as follows: “The state as a person of interna-
tional law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent popu-
lation; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states.” [Montevideo] Convention on Rights and Du-
ties of States, art.1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
62. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 37; OPPENHEIM, supra note 41, at 109;
Aziz Tuffi Saliba, Recognition/Non-Recognition in International Law, 75 Int’l
L. Ass’n Rep. Conf. 164, 170–74 (2012); Penelope Simmons, The Emergence of
the Idea of the Individualized State in the International Legal System, 5 J.
HIST. INT’L L. 293, 334–35 (2003); Eric Suy, New Players in International Re-
lations, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 373–83
(2002).
63. Victor Rodríguez Cedaño (Special Rapporteur on the Unilateral Acts of
States), Sixth Rep. on Unilateral Acts of States, ¶¶ 39–40, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/534 (May 30, 2003) (emphasizing that “Acts of recognition are … dis-
cretionary … [which] means … that there is no obligation to perform such an
act …”); see also Conf. on Yugoslavia Arb. Comm’n, supra note 60, at 1525–
26.
64. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 8, 2011, Hei 21 (Ju) No. 602,
603, 65 Saikō Saibansho Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 3275, paras, (I)(2)(6)-(7),
(II)(2)(Japan) (finding that, for purposes of the Berne Convention, the non-
recognition of North Korea as a state meant that Japan did not have to treat
North Korea as a state party to the treaty, but arguing that this conclusion
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the declaratory or the constitutive theory, there will inevitably
be a situation where some entities are not universally regarded
as states. The “grotesque spectacle”65 of inconsistent, subjective
statehood is unavoidable and in fact the normal functioning of
the decentralized international legal system. Perhaps it is not
so grotesque after all. It is the existence of this spectacle, and
its legal implications, that this article wishes to address.
Because of this naturally occurring inconsistency in some en-
tities’ statehood, where a state has recognized an entity as a
state (or quasi-state), regardless of which theory is being ap-
plied, the recognizing state should continue to treat the recog-
nized state as a state, notwithstanding the interpretation of the
situation by other states. Russian relations with Abkhazia
serve as a contemporary example.66 Although the recognition of
would not be possible where the obligation assumed was one of “general in-
ternational law”); see also Nat’l City Bank v. Rep. of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359
(1955); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938); Oetjen
v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); US Sec’y St. John Kerry, Re-
marks (Apr. 19, 2013), reprinted at US DEP’T OF STATE, OFC. LEGAL ADV.;
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (CarrieLyn D.
Guymon ed., 2013) (regarding the Serbia-Kosovo agreement); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §94(1) (AM. L. INST. 1965) (recognition is
where “a state commits itself to treat an entity as a state or to treat a regime
as the government of a state”) (this author’s emphasis); 2 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 27, at 72 (1906).
65. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 67, 78.
66. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,
Abkhazia-Russ., art. 1, Sept. 17, 2008, http://abkhasia.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/152365&usg=ALkJrhgzMrZNLX4ZUuqT7xhYODMii4bjNQ
(“The Contracting Parties shall build their relations as friendly states, con-
sistent with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of
force … and other universally recognized principles and norms of interna-
tional law.”) (translation by author); see also Agreement on the Establish-
ment of Informatory-Cultural Centres and the Conditions Governing their
Activities, Abkhazia-Russ., Apr. 26, 2011, reprinted in Парламент
ратифицировал соглашение между правительствами Абхазии и России об
оказании помощи РА в социально-экономическом развитии, APSNYPRESS
(June 15, 2012) http://apsnypress.info/news/6541.html (translation by au-
thor); Agreement on the Trade of Goods, Abkhazia-Russ., May 28, 2012, re-
printed in Подписано соглашение между правительствами Республики
Абхазия и Российской Федерации о режиме торговли товарами,
APSNYPRESS (May 29, 2012) http://apsnypress.info/news/6386.html (transla-
tion by author); Agreement on the Procedure of the Pension Schemes for In-
ternal Affairs Officials, Abkhazia-Russ., May 8, 2012, reprinted in Два
соглашения ратифицировано и одно принято в первом чтении,
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this entity might violate the rule of ex injuria, and thus could
not establish the entity as an objective state for all purposes,
that violation does not appear to preclude the Russian-Abkhaz
relationship from existing on the international plane.67 One can
compare Switzerland’s practice of treating the Global Fund as
an international legal person for certain purposes, such as its
Headquarters Agreement,68 though not for others. Switzer-
land’s practice resembles that of Russia-Abkhazia in taking a
subjective approach, though the latter is a discussion of states,
and, of course, the Global Fund does not implicate ex injuria.
The question, then, is how to determine which rights and ob-
ligations evidence statehood. Surely where two or more states
have entered into a treaty that instrument requires them to
accord international rights to an entity, the instrument is gov-
APSNYPRESS (May 8, 2012) http://apsnypress.info/news/6203.html (translation
by author); Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Prevention and Management,
Abkhazia-Russ., May 8, 2012, reprinted in Два соглашения
ратифицировано и одно принято в первом чтении, APSNYPRESS (May 8,
2012) http://apsnypress.info/news/6203.html (translation by author); Cooper-
ation Agreement on the Protection of State Borders, Abkhazia-Russ., Apr. 20,
2009, reprinted in Cегодня Россия подпишет соглашения с Абхазией и
Южной Осетией об охране границы, CAUCASIAN KNOT (Apr. 30, 2009)
http://abkhasia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/153576 (translation by author);
Agreement on a Joint Russian Military Base in Abkhazia, Abkhazia-Russ.,
Feb. 17, 2010, reprinted in Aбхазия и Россия подпишут соглашение об
объединенной военной базе, CAUCASIAN KNOT (Feb. 17, 2000)
http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/165534/ (translation by author). For the
similar relationship between Russia and South Ossetia, see Treaty of Friend-
ship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Russ-S. Ossetia, art. 1, Sept. 17,
2008, http://abkhasia.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/152334&usg=ALkJrhjxmc_q2WRUvfxPW2xvY1au3hH95g
(“The Contracting Parties shall build their relations as friendly states, con-
sistent with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of
force … and other universally recognized principles of norms of international
law”) (translation by author).
67. David M. Herszenhorn, Pact Tightens Russian Ties with Abkhazia,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/world/europe/pact-tightens-russian-ties-
with-abkhazia.html.
68. See generally Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council and the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in View of Determin-
ing the Legal Status of the Global Fund in Switzerland (Dec. 13, 2004)
Global Fund Doc. GF/B8/7, https://
www.theglobalfund.org/media/8551/core_headquarters_agreement_en.pdf?u=
637319004239270000 (last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
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erned by international law, and the states are bound to per-
form the treaty. While the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) restricts states from entering into treaties
that accord international obligations to third states,69 this rule
does not seem to apply when the agreement is constitutive of
an international organization.70 This same rule does not appear
to be applied by analogy to agreements constituting states,
partly because it is still controversial whether states can be
brought into existence in this fashion.71 Thus in order for obli-
gations to vest in a state-like actor, the entity must consent.72
By analogy, the same reasoning should apply to binding unilat-
eral statements to treat an entity as it were a state, potentially
obliging states to treat an entity as a state when it has been
subjectively recognized as such. Further, where a quasi-state
acts with some degree of personality, it will be held to the gen-
eral rules under customary international law, as any interna-
tional legal person would.
B. Functional Statehood for Certain Issues
1. Relative to Treaty Regimes
Certain treaties are open only to states, and possibly also in-
ternational organizations,73 but may permit a functional inter-
pretation of statehood. To provide some context for this conclu-
sion, consider that it is well accepted that sub-entities of a
state, such as provinces, may conclude treaties under interna-
tional law depending on the content of the treaty.74 Certainly,
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
70. Reparations Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, at 180.
71. See, e.g., Badinter Comm’n, supra note 59 (seemingly embracing the
declaratory theory).
72. See 2 Council of the Eur. Union, Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on
the Conflict in Georgia, The Report of the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, at 239–43 (Sept. 2009) [hereinaf-
ter IIFFMCG Report].
73. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organi-
zations or between International Organizations, art. 82, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.129/15 (1986) (not yet entered into force).
74. Saliba, supra note 62, at 172; Brad R. Roth, Secession, Coups and the
International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doc-
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the central or federal state authority may conclude a treaty on
behalf of one of its subdivisions or members of its federation,75
but this practice is not mandated by international law and is
primarily a domestic constitutional consideration.
There is well-established practice supporting this conclusion
that statehood can be relative for a particular treaty regime,
dating back many centuries. Historically, the German states
have exercised a wide latitude in concluding agreements, both
before76 and after their federation.77 Another example is the
trine, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2010); Thomas Grant, Defining State-
hood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 403, 434–35 (1998); See also, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, art. 32(3), translated in BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY (Christian Tomuschat & David P. Currie trans., 2008). Conven-
tion for the Protection of Lake Constance against Pollution, Oct. 27, 1960,
Austria – Baden-Württemberg – Bavaria – Switz. reprinted at Internationale
Gewässerschutzkommission für den Bodensee, Übereinkommen Über Den
Schutz Des Bodenseesgegen Verunreinigung,
http://www.igkb.de/html/publikationen/uebereinkommen.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2020) reprinted in G. SCHLOTTAU, ED., FRESH WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL, app. 7 (1966).
75. See, e.g., Exchange of notes constituting an agreement terminating a
Declaration of 27 August 1872 relating to succession or legacy duties so far as
it applies to the relations between the Canton de Vaud and the Common-
wealth of Australia, Austl.-Switz. (acting on behalf of the Canton of Vaud),
May 4–21, 1959, 341 U.N.T.S. 283, U.N. Reg. No. 4891; Exchange of notes
constituting an arrangement abrogating the Agreement of 27 August 1872
between Great Britain and Switzerland concerning succession duties, Can.-
Switz. (acting on behalf of Canton of Vaud), Mar. 28– June 23, 1958, 391-15
U.N.T.S. 215, U.N. Reg. No. 5625.
76. For Anhalt, see, e.g., Additional Act for the Navigation of the Elbe, Apr.
13, 1844, 96 CTS 307-1 [hereinafter Elbe Navigation Act]; Convention on the
Publication of Uniform Police Ordinances for the Elbe, Apr. 13, 1844, 96 CTS
307-3 [hereinafter Elbe Police Ordinances Convention]. For Hanover, see, e.g.,
Elbe Navigation Act, supra note 76; Elbe Police Ordinances Convention, su-
pra note 76. For Hesse-Darmstadt, see, e.g., Declaration respecting the
Measures taken for the Repression of Offences in the Border Forests, Jan. 8–
21, 1822, Hesse-Darm.-Nassau, 72 CTS 249 [hereinafter Border Forests Dec-
laration]. For Mecklenburg-Schwerin, see, e.g., Elbe Navigation Act, supra
note 76; Elbe Police Ordinances Convention, supra note 76. For Nassau, see,
e.g., Convention for the Repression of Offences in the Boundary Forests, Oct.
10–Nov. 20, 1821, 72 CTS 181 [hereinafter Border Forests Convention]; Con-
vention relative to the Abolition of the Droit de Détraction etc., May 17, 1822,
Den.-Nassau, 72 CTS 339; Border Forests Declaration, supra note 76. For
Prussia, see, e.g., Border Forests Convention, supra note 76; Elbe Navigation
Act, supra note 76; Elbe Police Ordinances Convention, supra note 76. For
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case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the treaty party
was sometimes the Empire of Austria-Hungary,78 sometimes it
was Hungary on its own behalf,79 sometimes Austria-Hungary
in its own capacity and separately on behalf of Bosnia-
Herzegovina,80 and sometimes Bosnia-Herzegovina in its own
competence.81 These cases, however, are not limited to histori-
cal Germany and Austria or to the obvious cases of colonial ter-
ritories with rights to self-determination. These cases also in-
clude entities such as Iceland82 and Norway83 that historically
Saxony, see, e.g., Elbe Navigation Act, supra note 76; Elbe Police Ordinances
Convention, supra note 76.
77. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Nov. 29 – Dec. 11, 1868 reprinted in
D. SCHINDLER AND J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 102 (1988) (in-
cluding as participants Austria-Hungary (Dec. 11, 1868), Baden (Jan. 11,
1869), Bavaria (Dec. 11, 1868), Wurtemberg (Dec. 11, 1868) and the joint
member of Prussia and the North German Confederation (Dec. 11, 1868));
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, LXI Brit. St. Papers
155-8 (1856) (including as participants Sardinia (Apr. 16, 1856), The Two
Sicilies (May 31, 1856), Parma (Aug. 20, 1856), and the German Confedera-
tion (July 10, 1856), but also Anhalt-Dessau-Coethen (June 17, 1856), Bavar-
ia (July 4, 1856), Baden (July 30, 1856), Bremen (June 11, 1856), Brunswick
(Dec. 7, 1857), Frankfort (June 17, 1856), Hamburg (June 27, 1856), Hesse-
Cassel (June 4, 1856), Hesse-Darmstadt (June 15, 1856), Lubeck (June 20,
1856), Mecklembourg-Schwerin (July 22, 1856), Mecklembourg-Strelitz (Aug.
25, 1856), Nassau (June 18, 1856), Oldenburg (June 9. 1856), Saxe-
Altenbourg (June 9, 1856), Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (June 22, 1856), Saxe-
Meiningen (June 30, 1856), Saxe-Weimar (June 22, 1856), Saxony (June 16,
1856), and Wurtemberg (June 25, 1856)).
78. See, e.g., Service Règlement annexed to the International Telegraph
Convention, June 11, 1908, 207 CTS 89 [hereinafter Int’l Telegraph Conven-
tion Service Règlement].
79. See, e.g., Regulations annexed to the Revised International Telegraph
Convention, July 10, 1903, 193 CTS 327 [hereinafter Int’l Telegraph Conven-
tion Regulations]; Revision of the International Service Regulations annexed
to the International Telegraph Convention of St. Petersburg of 22 July 1875,
July 22, 1875, 183 CTS 159 [hereinafter Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised
Regulations].
80. See, e.g., International Radiotelegraph Convention, July 5, 1912, 216
C.T.S 244 [hereinafter International Radiotelegraph Convention].
81. See, e.g., Int’l Telegraph Convention Service Règlement, supra note 78.
82. See, e.g., id.
83. See, e.g., Int’l Telegraph Convention Revised Regulations, supra note
79; Int’l Telegraph Convention Regulations, supra note 79; Int’l Telegraph
Convention Service Règlement, supra note 78; International Radiotelegraph
Convention, supra note 80.
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concluded treaties on their own behalf despite being in federa-
tion with Denmark and Sweden, respectively.
This practice continues in contemporary times. North Ossetia
has limited treaty making powers under the Russian constitu-
tion.84 South Ossetia also has limited authority within the
Georgian constitutional order to conclude certain treaties, such
as an armistice where it is party to an armed conflict.85 Simi-
larly, Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States—that is,
not a state or otherwise sovereign within the federation—yet
retains an important degree of international autonomy.86 Ad-
mittedly, in some cases of sub-entities of a state acting as par-
ties to international instruments, these agreements probably
do not amount to treaties as properly understood, simply be-
cause they do not have more than one state as party,87 but they
do constitute agreements.88 What this practice shows is that
84. See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF][Constitution], art.
72 (Russ.); IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 240.
85. Id.; see also Anne Peters, Treaty-Making Power, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 61–62 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed.
2009).
86. See Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2016) (“Be-
cause the ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power is the Federal
Government—because when we trace that authority all the way back, we
arrive at the doorstep of the U. S. Capitol—the Commonwealth and the Unit-
ed States are not separate sovereigns.”); see generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901); see also REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO
RICO’S STATUS 3, 17, 21 (2011); CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 22; Lisa Napoli,
The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a Colonized People: The
Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 159, 161–62 (1998). As to
whether or not the people of Puerto Rico retain a right to self-determination,
see Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, at 6 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In 1945 the
United States, when signing the United Nations Charter, promised change. It
told the world that it would “develop self-government” in its Territories. Art.
73(b), 59 Stat. 1048, June 26, 1945, T. S. No. 993 (U. N. Charter).”).
87. See, e.g., Mysore Agreement—Population Project, Int’l Dev. Assoc.-
Swe.-Mysore, June 14, 1972, 879 U.N.T.S. 3; Tunis Project Agreement—
Urban Planning and Public Transport Project for the Tunis District, Oct. 5,
1973, Int’l Bank Reconstr. & Dev. – Int’l Dev. Assoc.- Tunis, Oct. 5, 1973,
1063 U.N.T.S. 325; see also Uttar Pradesh Agreement—Population Project,
Int’l Dev. Assoc.-Swe.-Uttar Pradesh, June 14, 1972, 879 U.N.T.S. 27. See
also Vienna Convention, supra note 69, art. 2(1) (providing that only agree-
ment between states are treaties).
88. Note that the United Nations Charter and Vienna Convention distin-
guish between treaties and agreements, suggesting that they have different
meaning. See United Nations Charter, art. 102 ¶ 1 (“[e]very treaty and every
international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations
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within a state, there may be sub-entities that operate as quasi-
states, acting on the international plane from time to time, de-
pending on their functional role. Thus, there is nothing neces-
sarily objectionable about a territory that is normally consid-
ered part of a larger state operating on the international plane
based in its own right.
When states adopt treaties they can elect one of several
methods for designating the parties that are qualified to adhere
to the agreement. If they wish, the negotiating parties to a
treaty may adopt the “Vienna formula” to qualify the potential
parties.89 This formula is based on the approach taken in the
VCLT and limits participation to members of the UN, special-
ized agencies, International Atomic Energy Agency, or Interna-
tional Court of Justice, plus any other state specifically invited
by the UN General Assembly to participate.90 Although it ap-
pears quite strict, this language can be interpreted to include
entities other than states. For example, the Holy See—
importantly, not the Vatican City State—was able to adhere to
the Vienna Convention,91 despite the use of the strict Vienna
formula and despite the fact that the Holy See is not a state.
Similarly, Ukraine and Belarus could adhere to treaties under
the Vienna formula prior to their independence as states be-
cause they were already admitted to membership in the UN.92
after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be regis-
tered with the Secretariat and published by it”); see also Vienna Convention,
supra note 69, art. 31 ¶ 3. Indeed, the meaning is most likely that treaties are
legally binding whereas agreements may be either binding or not. See Mal-
gosia Fitzmaurice, The Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty
Obligations Between States in International Law, 2002 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
141, 143–44.
89. U.N. TREATY SECTION OF THE OFFICE LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF
PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS DEPOSITARY OF MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, ¶ 78(B)(1), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.15
(1999) [hereinafter U.N. Secretariat].
90. Vienna Convention, supra note 69, art 81.
91. U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. XXIII, No. 1,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
92. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (the
Byelorussian SSR signed on July 17, 1980, ratified on Feb. 4, 1981, and with-
drew its reservation on Apr. 19, 1989, and Ukrainian SSR signed on July 17,
1980, ratified on Mar. 12, 1981, and withdrew its reservation on Apr. 20,
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The Vienna formula is not mandatory and each treaty regime
may vest the word “state” with a different meaning.93 As an al-
ternative to the Vienna formula, states may use the “all states”
formula.94 Under this option, the parties do not use the elabo-
rate language of the Vienna formula, nor do they necessarily
indicate any clear parameters for determining which entities
are states, such as by UN General Assembly invitation. When
faced with an “all states” text, the UN Secretary General simp-
ly seeks guidance from the UN General Assembly, though not
necessarily requiring a clear, formal invitation.95 For example,
Guinea-Bissau and Vietnam were accepted as parties to the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea under this method when
they were not yet clearly consolidated as states.96
1989, when neither was considered a state under international law, but were
permitted to do so under the terms of the CEDAW).
93. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, art. 11 ¶ 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, as adjusted and amended
by Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 1598 U.N.T.S. 469, Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, 1785
U.N.T.S. 517, UNEP, Seventh Mtg. of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Oz.L.Pro.7/12
(Dec. 27, 1995), Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 17, 1997, 2054 U.N.T.S. 522., Amendment to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Dec. 3, 1999,
2173 U.N.T.S. 183., UNEP, Nineteenth Mtg. of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7 (Sept. 21, 2007).; UNEP, Fifteenth Mtg. of the Parties to
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Dec.
XV/3, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/9 (Nov. 11, 2003)
Recalling that . . . the Parties to the Beijing Amendment
have accepted obligations . . . to ban the import and export
of the controlled substances . . . from any ‘State not party to
this Protocol’ . . . . The term ‘State not party to this Protocol’
includes all other States and regional economic integration
organizations that have not agreed to be bound by the Co-
penhagen and Beijing Amendments.
94. U.N. Secretariat, supra note 89, ¶ 78–81.
95. See id. at ¶ 78, 81.
96. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. XXI, No. 6. U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=21&subid=A&clang=_en.
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This relative application of the definition of “state” in treaty
practice finds wide acceptance. Treaties adopting a flexible ap-
proach include such significant agreements as the Disabilities
Convention and Space Objects Convention, providing that
state-like entities might also participate as if they were
states.97 Even the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) is, theoretically, open to a liberal interpretation of the
term “state”.98 The ECHR permits any member of the Council
of Europe to become a party and the Saar was a member of the
Council of Europe.99 The Saar Protectorate was in existence
from 1947 to 1956 and, as part of Germany occupied by France
in the post-war framework, was not commonly considered a
state.100 In fact, in a plebiscite, the people of the Saar explicitly
rejected independent statehood in favor, implicitly, of reunifica-
97. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 44
¶¶ 1–2, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.; U.N. Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. XXII, Mar. 29, 1972, 961
U.N.T.S. 187.
98. See Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶
67, 86–88 (1992) (noting that, even though Andorra was admitted to be an
unusual entity, the ECHR observed that the Principality was a European
“country” and could adhere to the Statute of the Council of Europe as an as-
sociate member); Anthony Cullen & Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights of
Individuals in De Facto Regimes under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 691, 692 (2013).
99. See Statute of the Council of Europe, arts. 4–5, May 5, 1949, 87
U.N.T.S. 103 (although opening membership in the Council of Europe to
“[a]ny European State”); [European] Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, as amended
(ECHR), art. 59(1) (“This Convention shall be open to the signature of the
members of the Council of Europe.”) (opening membership of the ECHR to
any member of the Council of Europe, and the Saar was eligible to be a mem-
ber of the Council of Europe); Instrument of Accession of the Saar, May 13,
1950, 100 U.N.T.S. 302. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),
and then French-occupied Saarland became associate members. Council of
Eur., Federal Republic of Germany Joins the Council of Europe (July 13,
1950), https://70.coe.int/-/1950-federal-republic-of-germany-joins-the-council-
of-europe (last visited Nov. 25, 2020). The FRG became a full member in
1951, while the Saarland withdrew from its associate membership in 1956
after joining the FRG in 1955. Id. At the time of writing, there are no associ-
ate members in the Council of Europe.
100. See, e.g., Report of Mrs. W. v. F.S. (Ct. 1st Inst., Amsterdam, Neths.,
1954), reported at 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor International Recht 296, 50
AM. J. INT’L L. 440 (1956), reprinted in [1963] II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, ¶ 103,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1 (holding that the Saar was not a part of
Germany for purposes of the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure).
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tion with Germany (the Kleine Wiedervereinigung).101 Although
the Saar Protectorate never adhered to the ECHR, it was po-
tentially eligible to do so under a liberal interpretation of the
statehood requirement. Some authorities have even argued
that the European Union single market would be open to por-
tions of a state.102 The EU has acknowledged that a quasi-state
may be a party to a treaty with the Union as a “country” rather
than a “state,” under a flexible application of the law. 103
As a contemporary example from practice, consider Pales-
tine’s relative statehood under differing treaty regimes. Given
the number of treaties to which Palestine has adhered, it seems
that many treaty regimes have accepted Palestine as if it were
a state. Some of these instruments use the all states or a simi-
lar formula such as the Geneva Conventions,104 Convention on
101. See Saarländische Volkszeitung, Für Christentum und Demokratie,
No. 247 (Oct. 24, 1955) at 10; Treaty for the Settlement of the Question of the
Saar, Fr-Germ, Oct. 27, 1956, 1053 U.N.T.S. 337 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1957) (contemplating such items as, inter alia, “Saar nationals” “Saar Gov-
ernment” and “Saar law”).
102. See, e.g., Nikos Soutaris, Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can
Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain in the EU and/or Single Market?, 19
CAMBRIDGE YB EUR. L. STUDIES 287, 310 (2017) (discussing whether portions
of an EU Member State can remain in the single market upon the withdraw-
al of the Member State, however, participation in the single market is clearly
not the same as membership in the EU); see also Treaty amending, with re-
gard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities,
Feb. 1, 1985, O.J. (L 29).
103. See Case T-370/19, Spain v Eur. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2020:440, ¶ 30
(Sept. 23, 2020)
It follows that the provisions of the TFEU [Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union] relating to ‘third coun-
tries’ are clearly intended to pave the way for the conclusion
of international agreements with entities ‘other than
States’. Thus, the European Union may conclude interna-
tional agreements with territorial entities, covered by the
flexible concept of ‘country’, which have the capacity to con-
clude treaties under international law but which are not
necessarily ‘States’ for the purposes of international law. To
claim the contrary would be to create a legal vacuum in the
European Union’s external relations. (applying the law to
Kosovo).
104. See generally Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties and
Commentaries: Palestine, https://ihl-databa
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the Rights of the Child,105 Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women,106 Hague Convention,107 Disa-
bilities Convention,108 Torture Convention,109 Corruption Con-
vention110 or Apartheid Convention.111 However, Palestine is
also party to treaties that use the Vienna formula such as the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,112 Vienna Conven-
ses.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySe
lected=PS&nv=4 (last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
105. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 11, Convention
on the Rights of the Child,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
106. See generally U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 8,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wom-
en,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Nov. 25, 2020). See generally CEDAW,
supra note 92.
107. See Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries:
Palestine, https:/ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=PS&nv=4.
108. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 15, Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&clang=_en See generally U.N. Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, supra note 97.
109. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 9, Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&clang=_en See generally U.N. Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
110. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. XVIII, Penal Matters, No. 14, United
Nations Convention against Corruption
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVI
II-14&chapter=18&clang=_en. See generally U.N. Convention against Cor-
ruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
111. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 7, International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
7&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015
U.N.T.S. 243.
112. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. III, Privileges and Immunities, Diplo-
matic and Consular Relations, etc., No. 3, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
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tion on Consular Relations,113 Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination,114 Genocide Convention,115 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,116 International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,117 and, of course,
the VCLT.118 Palestine is also a member of UNESCO, a UN
specialized agency.119 Therefore, practice to date permits it to
qualify under either the all states formula or Vienna formula.
In many of these treaties, participation and compliance are
judged in a decentralized fashion, so non-recognition can pre-
Relations,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&clang=_en. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N. T. S. 95.
113. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. III, Privileges and Immunities, Diplo-
matic and Consular Relations, etc., No. 6, Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
6&chapter=3&clang=_en. See generally Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N. T. S. 261.
114. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 2, International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U. N. T.
S., 195.
115. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 1, Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
1&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
116. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 4, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
117. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. IV, Human Rights, No. 3, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en. See generally International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T. S. 3.
118. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. XXIII, Law of Treaties, No. 1,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X
XIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en. See generally Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 69.
119. Palestine, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, https://en.unesco.org/countries/palestine (last visited Nov. 25,
2020).
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clude a quasi-state from enjoying its rights and undertaking its
duties in relation to certain other parties. However, in situa-
tions where there is a treaty-monitoring body, tribunal or
court, the judgment is no longer decentralized. In a recent deci-
sion by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation concerning Palestine’s inter-state complaint against Is-
rael, the Committee found that both Palestine and Israel were
parties, which gave rise to the obligations erga omnes partes,
regardless of whether one of the states recognized the other
one.120 The Committee reasoned that human rights are of a
non-reciprocal nature121 and the Convention does not require
bilateral relations between any two parties in order for obliga-
tions to arise;122 thus, the inter-state dispute settlement proce-
dure applied.123 This view should not be surprising as it is al-
ready the practice within the United Nations when two UN
members do not recognize each other, as will be discussed in
more detail in the next section.
Lastly, this relativist approach to statehood also goes beyond
questions pertaining to which entities can adhere to a treaty
and can touch on other topics in a treaty where statehood is an
issue. For example, in the case of the Statelessness Convention,
even “an entity that is not a state” might be considered as if it
were a state for statelessness analysis.124 There appears to be
no restriction on a particular treaty regime developing its own
lex specialis, even on an issue as fundamental as statehood.
2. Relative to International Organizations
Palestine’s membership in UNESCO raises the next possibil-
ity that a state-like entity might be treated as if it was a state
for purposes of an international organization. An international
organization might need to recognize the entity as a state or
120. See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, In-
ter-State Communication Submitted by the State of Palestine Against Israel,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/100/5 (Dec. 12, 2019).
121. See id. ¶ 3.25.
122. Id. ¶ 3.40
123. See id. ¶ 3.43
124. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Statelessness No. 1: The
Definition of “Stateless Person” in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons, ¶¶ 11–14, U.N. Doc. HCR/GS/12/01 (Feb.
20, 2012) (interpreting the word “state” for purposes of the Convention defini-
tion of statelessness to potentially include “an entity which is not a State” but
admitting that the analysis can be “complex”).
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international legal person separate from the consideration of
membership or observer status. The UN Charter provides that
only states may bring matters of peace and security to the at-
tention of the UN Security Council125 and participate without a
vote.126 Several states have taken advantage of this opportuni-
ty even though their statehood was in question, including In-
donesia,127 Tunisia,128 and Kuwait.129 Although all of those enti-
ties are now clearly states, at least one case did not later ma-
ture into statehood and yet was treated as if it was a state at
the time: the Princely State of Hyderabad.130 Hyderabad had
existed as an independent Princely State in the Indian subcon-
tinent since the early 18th century and, though it came under
British suzerainty in 1805, it retained its nominal independ-
ence throughout British rule in India.131 Upon Indian inde-
pendence in 1947, the ruler of Hyderabad refused to join either
India or Pakistan, and reasserted the sovereignty of the state.
India invaded the territory in 1948 and forced its formal an-
125. See U.N. Charter, art. 11, ¶ 2; U.N. Charter, art. 32; U.N. Charter art.
35, ¶ 2; U.N. SCOR, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council,
at 6, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.4, U.N. Sales No. 52.I.18 (1946); U.N. Charter, arts.
11(2), 32, 35(2) (only permitting states to participate in UNSC sessions).
126. U.N. Charter, art. 32; U.N. SCOR, Provisional Rules of Procedure of
the Security Council, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.4
(1983) (requiring members and non-member states participating in Security
Council meetings to submit credentials prior to the meeting).
127. See U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 181st mtg. at 1940, U.N. Doc. S/PV.181
(Aug. 12, 1947).; U.N. SCOR, 3rd Sess., 357th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.357 (Sept.
16, 1948); But see U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 184th mtg. at 1984–1985, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.357 (Aug. 14, 1947) (UK arguing that the invitation of Indonesia was
incorrect).
128. See Theodor Schweisfurth, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, in 1 THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY ch. VI, art. 35, at 1114
(Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, Nikolai
Wessendorf, eds., 3rd ed. 2012).
129. See id.
130. See generally U.N. SCOR, 3rd Sess., 357th mtg. supra note 127; Also cf.
U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 184th mtg. supra note 128, at 1984–85 (UK arguing
that the invitation of Indonesia was incorrect) to UNSCOR 357th mtg. supra
note 127, at 10–11 (UK arguing in favor of hearing Hyderabad). See generally
Taylor C. Sherman, The Integration of the Princely State of Hyderabad and
the Making of the Postcolonial State in India, 1948-56, 44(4) IND. ECON. &
SOC. HIST. REV. 489 (2007).
131. See generally Clyde Eagleton, The Case of Hyderabad Before the Secu-
rity Council, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 277, 281–82 (1950).
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nexation.132 Subsequently, the deposed ruler of Hyderabad
brought the matter of Indian annexation to the UN Security
Council’s attention, claiming an unlawful use of force contrary
to the UN Charter. 133 As a threshold matter, the UN Security
Council agreed, at least prima facie, that Hyderabad was a
“state” under the UN Charter for these purposes.134
This decision is substantive and meaningful because other
delegations have been refused the opportunity to bring matters
to the UN Security Council for failure to be the functional
equivalent to a state.135 The UN Security Council has already
permitted Palestine to participate on prior occasions.136
Similarly, the Statute of the International Court of Justice
permits states that are not UN members to submit their dis-
putes. This was the basis for the Nottebohm judgment.137 Both
Palestine and Kosovo have been permitted to address the ICJ
132. See id. at 278.
133. See id.at 279–80.
134. See U.N. SCOR, 3rd Sess., 357th mtg. supra note 127 at 10–11 (implic-
itly reaching this conclusion by inviting Hyderabad under the terms in the
UN Charter concerning a “state,” though reserving the question for revision);
CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 191; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
42–43 (1963) (“entities which would not be considered states for the purposes
of a claim for comprehensive participation in the United Nations might nev-
ertheless satisfy the requirements of statehood where the claim is for limited
participation”).
135. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 193d mtg. at 2172, U.N. Doc. S/PV.357
(Aug. 22, 1947) (voting not to admit representatives of East Indonesia and
Borneo to the Security Council).
136. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 75th Sess., 8717th mtg. at 1–2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.8717 (Feb. 11, 2020) (“Agenda: The situation in the Middle East, includ-
ing the Palestinian question” and noting that Mahmoud Abbas, as “President
of the Observer State of Palestine,” was seated at the Council table); see also
G.A. Res. 52/250, ¶ 1 (July 13, 1998) (granting Palestine the right to partici-
pate in general debate of the General Assembly).
137. In addition, the Statute of the International Court of Justice permits
non-UN members to submit their disputes to the ICJ even if they decide
against membership in the UN by lodging a declaration to that effect with
the Court. This method was used by several micro-states to join the Court
without joining the UN, and in the case of Liechtenstein to actually lodge
disputes with the Court. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judg-
ment, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). However, in these cases, the applicants were
undoubtedly states when they sought to lodge their declarations with the
Court. See id. at 20 (“It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State,
to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its na-
tionality…”).
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as if they were states.138 This practice is in line with the prior
practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice which
treated the City of Danzig as if it was a state for the same pur-
poses.139 Importantly, both the Kosovo and Palestine entities
were grouped with states— i.e., they addressed the court
alongside other states during the sessions set aside for states—
but were only given this limited, functional privilege for the
purposes of the advisory proceedings pertaining to them.140 The
ICJ has therefore interpreted its own statute liberally, follow-
ing a practice similar to that of the Security Council.141
Turning to questions of membership, each international or-
ganization has in its constitutive instrument requirements for
membership. Some permit non-states as members, others do
not, but even where the constitutive instrument requires the
member to be a state, there is a wide variety of interpretations
138. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Verbatim Record, I.C.J. Doc. CR 2004/1 at 18 (Feb. 23,
2004, morning sess.) https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/131/131-
20040223-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf (invited to speak as “Palestine” alongside other
states) [hereinafter Legal Consequences Palestinian Territory]; Accordance
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Verbatim Record,
I.C.J. Doc. CR 2009/25 at 6 (Dec. 1, 2009, afternoon sess.) https://www.icj-
cij.org/public/files/case-related/141/141-20091201-ORA-02-00-BI.pdf (invited
to speak as the “authors of the unilateral declaration of independence”
though alongside other states) [hereinafter Unilateral Declaration of Kosovo].
139. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 31 (Danzig treated as a state for pur-
poses of the Permanent Court of International Justice). See also Danzig Pen-
sion Case (Obergericht (Superior Court) Danzig, 1929), reported at 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n para. 284 (1963) U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1 (holding
that the Free City of Danzig was not part of Poland for purposes of the law on
civil servant pensions).
140. See Legal Consequences Palestinian Territory, supra note 138; Unilat-
eral Declaration of Kosovo, supra note 138.
141. In addition, the European Union has also indicated that it will follow a
functional approach when faced with questions of statehood. See Case C-
482/99, France v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. I-4417 (Stardust Case) (“The concept
of the State has to be understood in the sense most appropriate to the provi-
sions in question and to their objectives; the Court rightly follows a functional
approach, basing its interpretation on the scheme and objective of the provi-
sions within which the concept features.”); Case C-356/05, Whitty v. Motor
Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. I-3112; Case C-157/02, Rieser Inter-
nationale Transporte GmbH v. Autobahnen-und Schnellstrßen-
Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag) [2004] E.C.R. I-1526; Case C-343/98, Collino and
Chiappero v. Telecom Italia Spa, 2000 E.C.R. I-6700; Case C-188/89, Foster v.
British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. I-1526.
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of the term “state” based on a functional perspective. For ex-
ample, the World Meteorological Organization bases member-
ship on whether the entity has a meteorological office,142 the
Universal Postal Union bases membership on postal delivery
services,143 and Interpol bases its membership on whether the
entity has police.144 Many other entities have followed this
functional model,145 such as the Food and Agriculture Organi-
142. See Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, Oct. 11,
1947, as amended by Res. 1 & 2 adopted by the 3d Congress, 1959; Res. 1 & 2
adopted by the 4th Congr., 1963; Res. 1, 2 & 3 adopted by the 5th Congr.,
1967; Res. 48 adopted by the 7th Congr., 1975; Res. 50 adopted by the 8th
Congr., 1979; Res. 41, 42 & 43 adopted by the 9th Congr., 1983; Res. 39 & 41
adopted by the 14th Congr., 2003; Res. 44 adopted by the 15th Congr., 2007,
art 3,
ftp://ftp.wmo.int/Documents/MediaPublic/Publications/Policy_docs/wmo_conv
ention.pdf (any territory that has a meteorological service may join, though
voting is not extended to British Caribbean Territories, French Polynesia,
Hong Kong, Macau, Neths. Antilles, and New Caledonia); CRAWFORD, supra
note 3, at 633 n. 146 (reporting admission of Cook Isls. as a member).
143. Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, 1964, as amended by the
Additional Protocols of 1969 adopted by the Tokyo Congr., III 5–8, 1974
adopted by the Lausanne Congr., III 23–25, 1984 adopted by the Hamburg
Congr., III 25–28, 1989 adopted by the Washington Congr., III/1 27–32, 1994
adopted by the Seoul Congr., III 25–29, 1999 adopted by the Beijing Congr., A
3–A 6, 2004 adopted by the Bucharest Congr., A 3–A 7, art 2 reprinted in In-
ternational Bureau of the Universal Postal Union, Constitution and General
Regulations Manual Rules of Procedure: Legal Status of the UPU with Com-
mentary, art. 2, Doc. A.8 (2018),
https://www.upu.int/UPU/media/upu/files/UPU/aboutUpu/acts/manualsInThr
eeVolumes/actInThreeVolumesConstitutionAndGeneralRegulationsEn.pdf
(also note the official Commentary to art 2. by the Int’l Bureau, including the
Neths. Antilles, Aruba, and UK Overseas territories). Also note that the UPU
permitted the admission of a member that represented a group of states or
non-autonomous territories: the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname joined as
a single member under this provision. Id.
144. See The State of Palestine and the Solomon Islands become INTERPOL







; CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 333 n.147 (reporting admission of the N. Maria-
na Isls. as a member and of Puerto Rico).
145. For the Asian Development Bank, see Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank, art. 3(3), Dec. 1965,
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https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-
document/32120/charter.pdf. For the Caribbean Development Bank, see
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Development Bank, art. 3, Oct. 18,
1969, (entered into force Jan. 26, 1970),
https://www.caribank.org/sites/default/files/publication-resources/Agreement-
establishing-CDB.pdf (“states and territories of the region”). Also note art.
3(4) of the Constitution, that the CDB permits the admission of a single
member to represent a group of states or non-autonomous territories. Id. at
art. 3(4). Anguilla, Montserrat, British Virgin Isls., Cayman Isls., and Turks
& Caicos Isls. joined as one member under this provision. Id. For the Europe-
an and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, see Convention for the
Establishment of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Org.,
Apr. 18, 1951, as amended Apr. 27, 1955, May 9, 1962, Sept. 18, 1968, Sept.
19, 1973, Sept. 23, 1982, Sept. 21, 1988, Sept. 15, 1999, art. III,
http://www.eppo.org/ABOUT_EPPO/convention/convention.htm (permitting
territories to become members even if their foreign relations are controlled by
another member, as long as that other member proposes their membership.
For the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission, see Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the
Belts (“Gdansk Convention”), art. V, Sept. 13, 1973 (establishing the Interna-
tional Baltic Sea Fishery Commission); see also Amendments to the Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea
and the Belts, Nov. 11, 1982 (amending the organization’s constitution to
permit the EC to become a member); see also Council Decision 83/414/EEC of
25 July 1983, 1983 O.J. (L 237) 4. For International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, see CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 633 n.146 (reporting admission of Cook
Isls. as a member of ICAO. For the International Coffee Organization, see
International Coffee Agreement, art 5, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://www.ico.org/documents/ica2007e.pdf (permitting separate membership
of territory under the same authority for foreign affairs, provided the member
proposes separate membership and the territory is otherwise qualified to join
the organization, no members admitted under this provision as of yet). Also
note that the organization permits the admission of a member that repre-
sents a group of states. See id. at art. 4 (Membership of the Organization),
art. 2(5) (providing that a member is a contracting party which his in turn a
“Government”). For the International Fund for Agricultural Development, see
CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 633 n.146 (reporting admission of Cook Isls. as a
member). For the International Institute of Refrigeration, see Convention
Concerning the International Institute of Refrigeration, June 21, 1920, as
amended May 31, 1973, replaced by International Agreement Concerning the
International Institute of Refrigeration, Dec. 1, 1954, as amended Sept. 2,
1967, Aug. 28, 1971, Aug. 17, 2003, Aug. 21, 2007, and August 17, 2015, art.
III,
https://iifiir.org/uploads/store/ckeditor/attachmentfile/29/data/8ca41a1bd0b54
26ce058b0e120365ecc.pdf. For the International Telecommunications Union,
see Agreement Establishing the International Telegraphic Union, 1865, re-
printed at UNION TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE INTERNATIONALE, DOCUMENTS DE LA
CONFÉRENCE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE INTERNATIONALE DE PARIS (1865) (permitting as
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zation,146 International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes,147 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons,148 UNESCO,149 World Health Organization (WHO),150
members colonial Southern Rhodesia and overseas territories of France, Por-
tugal, Spain, the UK and US); 1973 U.N.Y.B. 954, U.N. Sales No. E.75.I.1;
1975 U.N.Y.B. 1068, U.N. Sales No. E.77.I.1 (documenting that as of 1975,
the convention restricted membership only to states). See also Union Télégr.
Int’l, Verbaux de la 1ère séance de la Conference Télégraphique Internationale
de Rome 2 decembre 1871, in DOCUMENTS DE LA CONFERENCE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE
INTERNATIONALE DE ROME, UNION TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE INTERNAZIONALE (1872)
(documenting the participation of British India with a separate delegation
than the UK even as long ago as 1865); See generally GEORGE A. CODDING JR.,
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION: AN EXPERIMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1952); See generally GEORGE A. CODDING JR. &
ANTHONYM. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A
CHANGING WORLD (1982). For the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, see Conven-
tion on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
http://www.nafo.int/about/overview/governance/convention/convention.pdfhtt
p://www.nafo.int/about/overview/governance/convention/convention.pdf (es-
tablishing the NW Atlantic Fisheries).
146. See generally Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], Constitution,
art. II, http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/k1713e/k1713e01.htm#2 (permitting
regional economic integration organizations to be admitted as members, such
as the EU).
147. See Maffezini v. Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Dec. of the Trib. on Objs. to
Juris. (Jan. 25, 2000) reprinted at 1 ICSID Rev.-For. Invest. L. J 27-28, ¶74–
75
Under the ICSID Convention, the Centre’s jurisdiction ex-
tends only to legal disputes arising directly out of an in-
vestment between a Contracting state and a national of an-
other Contracting State . . . . However neither the term ‘na-
tional of another Contracting State’ nor the term ‘Contract-
ing State’ are defined in the Convention . . . . Accordingly
the Tribunal has to answer the following two questions:
first, whether or not SODIGA is a State entity for the pur-
pose of determining the jurisdiction of the Centre and the
competence of the Tribunal, and second, whether the actions
and missions complained of by the Claimant are imputable
to the State. While the first issue is one that can be decided
at the jurisdictional state of these proceedings, the second
issue bears on the merits of the dispute and can be finally
resolved only at that state.
148. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 633 n.146 (reporting admission of Cook
Isls. as a member).
2020] Functional Statehood in Contemporary Int'l Law 75
World Trade Organization,151 as well as possibly the World
Bank152 and International Monetary Fund.153 We can recall
that the People’s Republic of China, for a brief time, dropped its
opposition to observer status for the Republic of China (RO
China, or more commonly, Taiwan) at the WHO due to real
concerns over health issues in the region,154 though it has since
returned to its former policy of blocking the island from partic-
ipation.155 Recently the applications of Kosovo and Palestine to
join the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), while initially
uncontroversial, have since forced an unusual membership re-
consideration by the PCA Administrative Council to deal with
the situations.156
This relativist approach to statehood for purposes of mem-
bership even includes UN practice. It is well known and ac-
149. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 633 n.145 (reporting the admission of
Niue as a member); Id. at 633 n.146 (reporting admission of Cook Isls. as a
member).
150. See id. at 633 n.145 (reporting the admission of Niue as a member); Id.
at 633 n.146 (reporting admission of Cook Isls.); Id. at 633 n.147 (reporting
admission of Puerto Rico).
151. SeeMarrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
art. XII(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (permitting admission of sepa-
rate customs territory, such as Hong Kong and “Chinese Taipei” (RO Chi-
na/Taiwan); Id. arts. XI(1), XIV(1) (permitting the admission of the European
Communities).
152. Kosovo Joins World Bank Group Institutions, OCHA (June 29, 2009),
https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/kosovo-joins-world-bank-group-institutions.
153. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. II(2) June 28, 1990 (entered
into force Dec. 27, 1945), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf
(“Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and in accord-
ance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors. These
terms, including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles con-
sistent with those applied to other countries that are already members.”);
Kosovo Joins World Bank Group Institutions, supra note 152.
154. See Keith Bradsher, Taiwan Takes Step Forward at U.N. Health Agen-
cy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/world/asia/30taiwan.html (reporting that PR
China “officials had dropped their objections to Taiwan’s participation as an
observer at” the WHO).
155. See, e.g., Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen, Why Does the WHO Exclude
Taiwan?, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-
brief/why-does-who-exclude-taiwan (noting that the PR China has since re-
versed policy and is blocking observer status for RO China/Taiwan).
156. Gentian Zyberi, Membership in International Treaties of Contested
States: The Case of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5(3) ESIL REFLECTION
(Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/1261.
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cepted that both Ukraine and Belarus were not independent
states when they joined the UN,157 notwithstanding that UN
membership is expressly limited to “states”.158 In fact, Belarus’
and Ukraine’s memberships have, in turn, served as the basis
for treating those entities as if they were states prior to their
independence from the USSR for purposes of applying the Vi-
enna formula for treaty adherence.159 Part of what makes the
Belarus and Ukraine examples so compelling is that there was
no effort made to alter the language of the UN Charter restrict-
ing membership to states in light of the political compromise to
admit them.160 It appears that the states negotiating in San
Francisco did not see a need to clarify that “state” could obvi-
ously be interpreted to include both of those non-independent
entities. But Ukraine and Belarus were not unique. Both India
and the Philippines joined the UN before either could be truly
said to be independent.161 There is also no evidence that
157. See UN Office of Legal Counsel, Legal Op. No. 15, Questions regarding
the scale of assessment for Belarus and Ukraine in the light of the change in
the relationship between them and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics – Report of the Committee on contributions on “Assessment of New mem-
ber States” – General Assembly Resolution 46/221 A and Rule 160 of the
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, Fifth Committee, 38th meeting
(Dec. 8, 1992) reprinted at 1992 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 435, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.C/30 (confirming that Ukraine and Belarus are “original Mem-
bers” of the United Nations following their dissolution from the Soviet Un-
ion); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2005).
158. See U.N. Charter, arts. 3, 4; Conditions of Admission of a State to
Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 62
(May 28, 1948).
159. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 92; see also U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 97, art. 44(1)–(2); Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, supra note
97, art. XXII.
160. See UN Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 157; AUST, supra note 157,
at 18; Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (Ukr. 1990); U.N. Charter,
arts. 3, 4; Admiss. of a St. to the U.N. (Charter, Art. 4), Adv. Op. 1948 I.C.J.
Reps. 57, 62 (May 28, 1948).
161. See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 52–55 (1987)
(discussing Byelorussia, India, Lebanon, Namibia, the Philippines, Syria, and
Ukraine); Roger O’Keefe, The Admission to the United Nations of the Ex-
Soviet and Ex-Yugoslav States, 1 BALTIC YB INT’L L. 167, 171–76 (2001) (ob-
serving that the admission of Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to
the United Nations when each had only tenuous governmental authority
demonstrates the United Nations “flexible approach to the formal criteria for
membership”); cf. FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 50 (1986) (noting the ILO’s admission of Vietnam in 1950, at
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Ukraine and Belarus were ever treated differently from other
UN members for any other purpose. Once membership was es-
tablished, there was no need to justify statehood for each dis-
crete act of the UN pertaining to those entities. That being
said, the RO China’s renewed application for membership to
the UN was rejected on the grounds that it was a part of the
territory of China, although the application itself was unclear
about that fact.162
Recently, Palestine attempted to accept the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), join the Court, and then
trigger its jurisdiction over certain individuals, causing consid-
erable discussion to erupt over whether it was a state. Many
scholars, including this author, settled on the functional ability
of the Palestinian Authority to discharge its obligations.163 Fol-
lowing from this practice above, it is clearly possible that the
term “state” in the Rome Statute could be understood to permit
quasi-states to adhere.164 The treaty elects not to use the Vien-
na formula and instead uses the “all states” terminology,165
a time when France still exerted influence over Vietnam’s foreign affairs); but
see U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 985th mtg. at 8–10, U.N. Doc S/PV.985 (Nov. 30,
1961) (presenting arguments made regarding whether Kuwait was sufficient-
ly independent from the United Kingdom to be admitted to the United Na-
tions); see also HIGGINS, supra note 134, at 16–17 (suggesting that although
certain countries that fell short of meeting the criteria for statehood, like In-
dia, were admitted as original members to the United Nations, these cases
are not truly indicative of United Nations practice).
162. Cf. UN Rejects Taiwan Application for Entry, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2007) https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24iht-
taiwan.1.6799766.html?_r=0 with J. Michael Cole, UN Told to Drop ‘Taiwan
is a Part of China’: Cable, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011)
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/06/2003512568 (on
the one hand, the rejection the application for membership, yet on the other
hand, the demand from many states to stop officially considering the RO
China/Taiwan as part of China); see also G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), at 2 (Oct. 25,
1971) (expelling “Republic of China” (Taiwan) delegation in favor of those
from the PR China as representing “China”).
163. See generallyWorster, supra note 51.
164. See id. The Rome Statute refers to “States” or “States Parties” in sev-
eral articles. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
arts. 4(2), 9(1), (2), 11(2), 12(1), (3), 13(a), 14, 17(1)(a)-(b), 18, 125(1), (3), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
165. Rome Statute, art. 125(1) (“This Statute shall be open for signature by
all States in Rome, at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations, on 17 July 1998. Thereafter, it shall remain
open for signature in Rome at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy until 17
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although either usage would permit a liberal interpretation. A
liberal approach must be possible because the ICC has already
adopted this interpretation of the Rome Statute in practice well
before Palestine was an issue. The Cook Islands have long been
a member of the ICC,166 though that entity is not clearly a
state. This author can find no evidence that the admission of
the Cook Islands was met with any serious protests at the
time. Thus, for membership issues, it is well established that
an international organization can interpret the meaning of
“state” in its constitutive instrument in a relative manner.
Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the pending question of
Palestinian statehood should conclude that it is correct to in-
terpret the “all states” language in the Rome Statute to include
entities that have only questionable statehood, and generally
treat them as if they were states. A contrary ruling would nec-
essarily bring the membership of the Cook Islands into doubt
and perhaps even challenge whether Ukraine and Belarus
were properly admitted to the UN as original members.
3. Private Rights
One way that an entity which is not considered a state might
be treated as a state is for other states to accord its acts as hav-
ing legal effect, i.e., the “Namibia exception.”167 In the Namibia
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that South Africa’s control of
Namibia was not lawful and thus could not have legal effect.168
However, by not recognizing South Africa’s governance, the lo-
cal population would be prejudiced by losing recognition state
acts such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages.169
Thus, although it was not a state and the South African regime
was unlawful, the state acts were valid.170 How a non-state
could produce state acts is answered by the need to provide for
October 1998. After that date, the Statute shall remain open for signature in
New York, at United Nations Headquarters, until 31 December 2000.”); “This
Statute shall be open to accession by all States. Instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” Id. art.
125(3).
166. Asia-Pacific States, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/asian%20states
.aspx.
167. See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 24, at 55–56.
168. See id.; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 (2001).
169. See Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 24, at 55–56.
170. See id.
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individual rights. Thus, courts may give legal effect to the rou-
tine acts of administration of unrecognized states, unless there
is a strong public policy against the recognition.171
This approach has been applied beyond the situation in Na-
mibia. For example, Western Sahara was addressed as if it was
a state for purposes of human rights analysis.172 This approach
may again be a pragmatic solution to a situation where it is
politically unacceptable to either consider the entity an inde-
pendent state or lend legitimacy to the territory’s occupation.173
This reality supports the fundamental argument of this article.
Quasi-states and territories of unclear statehood are being ac-
commodated by attributing aspects or elements of statehood to
them, all the while refusing full-fledged statehood.
4. Human Rights
If legal value is accorded to the purported public acts of non-
states in the interest of human rights, one might then take the
next step and demand that the non-states comply with human
rights generally.174 This approach could be limited—e.g., re-
quiring public acts to comply with a right to court access in or-
der to receive recognition—or expansive—e.g., holding quasi-
171. See id.; Hopkins (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 41, 41
(Gen. Claims Comm’n. 1926); R. (on the application of Kibris Turk Hava Yol-
lari) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2009] EWHC (Admin) 1918, [2010] 1
All ER (Comm.) 253; Emin v Yeldag [2002] 1 FLR 956 (Austl.); B. v. B. [2000]
2 Fam. 707 (Eng.); Reel v. Holder, [1981] 1 WLR 1226 (Eng.) (interpreting the
meaning of “country” under International Amateur Athletic Federation rules
as territory over which there is authority, not necessarily the same as the
meaning of state or nation); Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v. Aegean Turkish Holi-
days Ltd. [1978] 1 QB 205 (Eng.); In re Al-Fin Corporation’s Patent, [1970] 1
Ch. 160 at 177-81 (Eng.); Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co. [1956] 2
QB 552 (Eng.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 205(3)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
172. See U.S. Dep’t State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Western Sahara (2015),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/253165.pdf.
173. But see U.S. Dep’t State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Israel and the Occupied Terri-
tories (2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/253139.pdf.
174. See Philip Alston, The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International
Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3–6 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
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states responsible for human rights violations.175 Some non-
state actors already comply with international human rights
voluntarily, even though not formally bound to comply, because
of a desire to appear more state-like and thus accrue interna-
tional legitimacy.176 For example, the RO China has acted in
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR), even though it is no longer a party.177 In
addition, there is evidence of evolution in the possibility of
holding state-like entities responsible for human rights viola-
tions.178 Historically, quasi-states were usually analogized with
private actors, and thus not held to human rights law, as the
DC District Court in Tel-Oren v Libya concluded concerning the
Palestine Liberation Organization.179 However, contemporary
175. See generally Toni Erskine, Assigning responsibilities to institutional
moral agents: The case of states and quasi-states, 15(2) ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 67
(2001); Sascha Dov Bachmann & Martinas Prazauskas, The Status of Unrec-
ognized Quasi-States and Their Responsibilities Under the Montevideo Con-
vention, 52(3) INT’L LAWYER 393 (2019).
176. See CLAPHAM, supra note 20, at 291–94.
177. See President Ma Attends Press Conference Unveiling English Version
of Taiwan’s First National Human Rights Report under the ICCPR and
ICESCR, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (Dec. 18, 2012)
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=28855&rmid
=2355 (“The president [of the ROC] explained that the ROC, as a founding
member of the UN, signed the two human rights covenants back in 1967, but
after losing its representation in the UN was unable to further participate in
UN conferences or activities, so action to ratify these two covenants was de-
layed. However, in response to widespread calls here for Taiwan’s human
rights protections to be brought in line with international practices … [o]n
May 14 of the following year, the president formally signed the instruments
of ratification for the two covenants”); President Ma Holds Press Conference
on the Release of Taiwan’s First Human Rights Report OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (Apr. 20, 2012),
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3880.
178. See generally ALSTON, supra note 174.
179. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 791–92, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
The Palestine Liberation Organization is not a recognized
state, and it does not act under color of any recognized
state’s law . . . . It would require an assessment of the ex-
tent to which international law imposes not only rights but
also obligations on individuals . . . . While I have little doubt
that the trend in international law is toward a more expan-
sive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other
than states, I decline to read section 1350 to cover torture
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developments suggest that opinion may be beginning to
change, and that these entities could be analogized with public
actors, as the Southern District of New York appeared to do in
Sokolow also concerning the PLO.180 In any event, state-like
entities are increasingly being treated as if they were states for
purposes of human rights obligations.
5. Nationality
Similarly, some states will recognize the nationality of a per-
son notwithstanding whether their “state” of nationality is not
itself recognized as a state.181 Setting aside the unique regime
of “national” for purposes of international sport or similar con-
cerns, where individuals might easily hold the nationality of a
non-state entity,182 there are cases where nationality has been
recognized for a wider variety of purposes.183 In 1924, the Irish
by non-state actors, absent guidance from the Supreme
Court on the statute’s usage of the term “law of nations.”
180. See Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04 CIVIL 00397 (GBD),
2015 WL 10852003 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2015), (finding PLO and PA liable for
funding terrorism) vacated and remanded sub nom., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.
2016); Nicole Hong, Jury Finds Palestinian Authority, PLO Liable for Terror-
ist Attacks in Israel a Decade Ago; Federal Jury Orders Groups to Pay $218.5
Million to Victims’ Families, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/jury-finds-palestinian-authority-plo-liable-for-
terrorist-attacks-in-israel-a-decade-ago-1424715529. That being said,
Sokolow was vacated and remanded by the Second Circuit, holding that “nei-
ther the PLO nor the PA is recognized by the United States as a sovereign
state.” Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, at 22 (2d Cir.
2016).
181. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 403.9-3(B)(2) (2020)
(regarding passports from ROC Taiwan and Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus); Caglar v. Billingham [1996] STC 150 (Eng.); 584 Parl. Deb HL (5th
ser.) (1998) col. 205 (UK), 304 Parl. Deb HC (6th ser.) (1998) col. 277 (UK);
CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 31 (regarding “A” Mandated Territories).
182. See Palestine, OLYMPIC, http://www.olympic.org/Palestine.
183. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, supra note 151, art. XII(1) (permitting members of any separate cus-
toms territory, currently Hong Kong, Macau, and Chinese Taipei, to be ad-
mitted); Id. art. XI(1); Id. art. XIV(1) (permitting the admission of the Euro-
pean Communities) (“The terms ‘country’ or ‘countries’ as used in this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements are to be understood to
include any separate customs territory Member of the WTO. In the case of a
separate customs territory Member of the WTO, where an expression in this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is qualified by the term
‘national’, such expression shall be read as pertaining to that customs territo-
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Free State seceded from the UK and began administering some
sovereign powers, although it remained unclear whether it con-
sidered itself an independent state or was merely exercising
sovereign powers delegated from the UK. In 1937, Ireland
adopted a new constitution which declared the entity a sover-
eign state and claimed the entire island as the territory of the
state.184 However, Irish persons continued to be considered
British nationals under the law of the UK.185 It was only in
1949 that Ireland declared itself a republic and thus outside of
the Commonwealth.186 Nonetheless, the UK has continued to
legislate that Irish people are not considered “foreigners”,187
meaning that they have the right to abode within the UK, can
vote in UK elections, and stand for British Parliament. Oddly,
Irish citizens resident in the UK could even vote in the Brexit
referendum.188 The people of Northern Ireland under the Good
Friday Agreement have even more ambiguous status in that
ry, unless otherwise specified.”); see also, e.g. Paul Koring, Palestine Exists for
a Select Few Canadians, GLOBE & MAIL (Sep. 20, 2011),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/palestine-exists-for-a-select-few-
canadians/article594913/ (providing that “Palestine” exists as a valid “Coun-
try of Birth” for Canadians, although the government does not recognize Pal-
estine as a state). But see U.S. DEP’T STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL
403.4-4(A) (2019) (prohibiting “Palestine” as a valid country of birth after
1948, and requiring instead “West Bank” or “Gaza Strip”).
184. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 2 (“national territory [of the Irish
state] consists of the whole island of Ireland”); Id. art. 3 (“Pending the re-
integration of the national territory . . . the laws enacted by [the Irish] Par-
liament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saor-
stat Éireann [the Irish Free State]”). This claim was withdrawn in 1999 in
the course of the Northern Ireland peace process.
185. See 465 Parl. Deb HC (5th ser.) (1949) col. 2235-36 (UK) (Sec’y St.
Home Aff’rs).
186. See The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 (Act No. 22/1948),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1948/act/22/enacted/en/html#.
187. See British Nationality Act 1981 c. 61, § 50(1) (“alien” means a person
who is neither a Commonwealth citizen nor a British protected person nor a
citizen of the Republic of Ireland” … “foreign country” means a country other
than the United Kingdom, a dependent territory, a country mentioned in
Schedule 3 and the Republic of Ireland”); see alsoMARY FULBROOK, A HISTORY
OF GERMANY 1918-2008: THE DIVIDED NATION 32 (4th ed. 2015) (documenting
West German legislation that provided that East Germans were not foreign-
ers, though they were citizens of an independent state).
188. See European Union Referendum Act 2015, c. 36 §2(2)(a)-(b) (Dec. 17,
2015) (“A person falls within this subsection [entitled to vote in the Brexit
referendum] if the person is either — a Commonwealth citizen, or . . . a citi-
zen of the Republic of Ireland.”).
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they are considered Irish and British citizens simultaneously
and may select either citizenship.189 Apparently a state of na-
tionality can be relative depending on function.
Recent practice before the UN Compensation Commission
(UNCC) is even more on point. The default rules on diplomatic
protection of nationals before the UNCC were amended with a
lex specialis rule permitting states to submit claims on behalf
of persons resident on their territory.190 This approach was un-
dertaken to solve the recurring problem of protection for state-
less persons or other unwillingness of states to exercise protec-
tion over their nationals.191 The practice was well in line with
the progressive development of the law proposed in the Inter-
national Law Commission Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protec-
tion.192 Even more significantly, non-state entities were also
given permission to exercise diplomatic protection over claims
by their “nationals”.193 This in itself was not too shocking in
that the ICJ has since 1948 recognized that an international
organization could exercise protection over claims where the
189. See generally The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, U.K.-Ir., Apr.
10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 751
The participants . . . will . . . recognise the birthright
of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify them-
selves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as
they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that
their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is
accepted by both Governments and would not be af-
fected by any future change in the status of Northern
Ireland.
190. See Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, art. 5.1, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26, 1992) (permitting a government to “submit claims
on behalf of its nationals and, at its discretion, of other persons resident in its
territory”). See generally Carmel Whelton, The United Nations Compensation
Commission and International Claims Law: A Fresh Approach, 25 OTTAWA L.
REV. 607, (1993).
191. See generallyWhelton, supra note 190.
192. See Intl’ Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, at
18, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006); Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/Dec.225 (July 2, 2004).
193. See Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, supra note 190, at 5, ¶ 2 (per-
mitting claims by an appointed body or authority on behalf of individuals
where the state of nationality will not or cannot claim).
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international organization is responsible for the person.194 This
modest extension of the practice could now cover de facto states
in addition to international organizations. On this basis, the
Palestinian Authority was authorized to submit claims on be-
half of its “nationals” as if it were a state.195 Perhaps this
change in direction evidences a softening on general opposition
to the Palestinian claim to statehood or perhaps it simply
acknowledges that Palestine is, at the least, a quasi-state with
sufficient functional capacity to take up the claims of its people.
Similar considerations may appear in the pending ICC case,
the Situation in Palestine, if the Court seeks to exercise its ju-
risdiction over Palestinians on the basis of nationality.
6. International Criminal Law
Although not per se human rights law, international criminal
law considerations might also justify treating certain entities
as if they were states. International humanitarian law already
applies to non-state actors, along with the rules on war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide.196 For one international
criminal offense in particular, however, statehood is critical:
aggression. The crime of aggression applies to individuals act-
ing in a state leadership position.197 Perhaps in order to contin-
ue its campaign against impunity, the ICC may wish to inter-
pret “state” liberally to include state-like entities.198 While it is
widely understood that state-like entities—since they are not
194. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Na-
tions, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, at 187 (Apr. 11).
195. See Linda A. Taylor, The United Nations Compensation Commission,
in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 197, 202 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens eds.,
2009) (noting that the Palestinian Authority was permitted to file claims);
Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by
the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of Palestinian
“Late Claims” for Damages Up to USD 100,000 (Category “C” Claims), at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2003/26 (2003).
196. See Marco Sassòli, The Implementation of International Humanitarian
Law: Current and Inherent Challenges, 10 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 63
(2007).
197. See Int’l Crim. Ct., Res. 6: The Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6
(June 11, 2010); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
198. See Worster, supra note 51; Cooks Islands, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/cook%20island
s.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2020).
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formally states—do not have an obligation to enforce and pun-
ish international criminal law,199 this view appears to be
changing with some authorities concluding that a quasi-state
incurs this state obligation.200 Once one obliges state-like enti-
ties to act like states in prosecuting international criminal law,
one might also be obliged to accord ne bis in idem effect, where
applicable, to their judgments.201 This concern over the crime of
aggression leads to the next issue, the use of force.
7. Use of Force and Armed Conflict
Another situation where an entity not understood to be a
state might nonetheless be treated as if it were a state is where
there is a risk of the use of force by the entity or against it.202
Traditionally the prohibition on the use of force, usually with
reference to the UN Charter Article 2(4), though also generally
under customary international law, is understood to apply only
to states.203 States remain free to use force in their internal af-
fairs to maintain law and order—for example, by resisting an
armed rebel faction, civil war, or terrorist group,204 —so that,
199. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), at 240, 289, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Claus Kreß & Kim-
berly Prost, Article 87, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1517, 1523 (2d ed., 2008); 1 JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 607 (2005).
200. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 1633, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sep.
15, 2009) (any entity in the Gaza Strip that functions as a government is re-
sponsible for enforcing international humanitarian law and human rights
law on armed groups in Gaza).
201. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (providing that an accused may not be tried again for
the same offense).
202. See Anthony Cullen & Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights of Indi-
viduals in De Facto Regimes under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 691 (2013); Christian Hillgruber, The Admission
of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491, 492,
494, 498 (1998).
203. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 239.
204. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 80
(July 22); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opin-
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usually in order for a use of force to violate Article 2(4), some
state-to-state involvement is required.205 However, some au-
thorities are now asserting that Article 2(4) and/or customary
international law also prohibit the use of force by or against a
sufficiently state-like entity.206 Even though the prohibition is
addressed to “states,” it has been argued that this term should
not be understood to be judged only by recognition or UN mem-
bership, i.e. a functional approach should be taken.207 Here the
entity may be assimilated to a state, although for all other pur-
poses it would not be considered a state.208 What may be key to
ion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) Al-
brecht Randelzhofer, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 1397 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2002).
205. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb & Montenegro), Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. 397 (June 1); Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146–
47; Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14; SC Res 262 (XXIII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 31, 1968);
U.N. Dept. Pol. & Security Council Aff., Repertoire of the Practice of the Se-
curity Council Supplement 1966-1968, at 146, 163–64. U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/1/Add.5 (1971; Jörg Kammerhofer, The Armed Activities Case and
Non-State Actors in Self-Defence Law, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 89, 98–112 (2007).
206. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Every State [...] has
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate international
lines of demarcation.”); Christian J. Tams & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Use of
Force, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD (Jean
D’Aspremont & Jörg Kammerhofer eds., 2013) (arguing that the prohibition
on the use of force includes force against “stabilized territorial entities that
are not States”); O. CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (2010); J. Frowein,
De Facto Regime, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 61–62 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2009); Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V.
Prescott, Resolving Cross Strait Relations between China and Taiwan, 94 AM.
J. INT’L L. 453, 474 (2000).
207. See Nicolai N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Geor-
gia, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1524, 1526–28 (2009) (“[n]o consideration of what-
ever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as
a justification for aggression” and, “[a] war of aggression is a crime against
inter-national peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.”).
208. See Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of
Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 101, 104 (2004) (dis-
cussing the theory of de facto states as special entities:
The legal position of a de facto regime corresponds to that of
a State, i.e. it ipso jure has those minimum rights and obli-
gations that are concomitant with statehood. If there are
differences to a recognized State in its legal standing, these
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this position is that the entity has achieved its own de facto in-
dependence,209 excluding sham national liberations orchestrat-
ed by external states which might mask Article 2(4) violations.
This argument actually has some historical precedent. For
example, consider the UN Security Council discussions over the
use of force by India against Hyderabad, discussed above.210
The Security Council could have dismissed the matter out of
hand by concluding that Hyderabad was simply not a state. In-
stead, the Security Council applied a flexible interpretation of
the UN Charter Articles 32 and 35(2), effectively finding that
an entity whose statehood is questionable, but who has some
statehood functions, could complain on the international level
about the use of force against it.211 In addition, James Crawford
has concluded that the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by
PR China against RO China, despite RO China not being gen-
erally understood to be a state and not being a party to the UN
Charter—or rather, no longer being party.212
In contemporary times, this argument has been invoked to
cover entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia.213 The In-
are found in the area of optional relations, that is within
States’ discretion. (footnote omitted).)
209. See Jonathan I. Charney & J. R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross Strait
Relations between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 469 (2000).
210. See U.N. SCOR 357th mtg. No. 109, 3–21 (Sept. 16, 1948); see also G.A.
Res. 2626 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970), Principle I, para. 6 (“States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”), para.
7 (“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which de-
prives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence.”). But see id. at para. 13 (“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs
shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of the
provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is law-
ful.”).
211. SeeCRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 191; HIGGINS, supra note 134, at 42–43.
212. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 219, 221 (“the suppression by force of
23 million people cannot be consistent with the [United Nations] Charter,”
and that therefore “[t]o that extent there must be a cross-Strait boundary for
the purposes of the use of force.”)
213. See generally Anthony Cullen & Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights
of Individuals in De Facto Regimes under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, 13(4) HUM. RTS. L. REV. 691 (2013); Frowein, supra note 206, at ¶
1.
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dependent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict
in Georgia (IFFMCG) concluded in its report that South Osse-
tia, being “an entity short of statehood,”214 and Abkhazia, being
“a state-like entity,” could benefit from the prohibition on the
use of force in international law.215 Similarly, South Ossetia
should be protected by the prohibition on acts of aggression216
and should also benefit from the right of self-defense.217 This
conclusion was supported by the 1992 Sochi Agreement be-
tween Georgia and Russia on the armed hostilities in South
Ossetia acknowledging “the commitment to the UN Charter
and the Helsinki Final Act.”218 Russia has pledged to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia that it considers them states under interna-
tional law and as such it is constrained by the international
law norm prohibiting the use of force. The IIFFMCG also cited
the 1994 Agreement on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict where
Georgia and Russia (as well as North and South Ossetia)
pledged that they would not use force in the situation in South
Ossetia.219 In the case of Abkhazia, the IIFMCG cited the 1994
Moscow Agreement similarly obliging the parties to “refrain
from all military operations against each other.”220 The
214. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 134.
215. See id. at 229–42. See also The Agreement on Principles of Settlement
of the Georgian-Ossetia Conflict, June 24, 1992 (“Sochi Agreement”) reprinted
in TAMAZ DIASAMIDZE, REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA (THE AUTONOMOUS
OBLAST OF SOUTH OSSETIA, THE AUTONOMOUS SSR OF ABKHAZIA 1989-2008):
THE COLLECTION OF POLITICAL-LEGAL ACTS 110 (2d ed., 2008); The Agreement
on the Further Development on the Process of the Peaceful Regulation of the
Georgia-Ossetian Conflict and on the Joint Control Commission, Oct. 31,
1994 reprinted in id. at 192; The Memorandum on Necessary Measures to be
Undertaken in Order to Ensure Security and Strengthening of Mutual Trust
between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, May 16, 1996 reprint-
ed in id. at 244.
216. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XIXX), Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974).
217. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 241.
218. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 240; see generally The Agree-
ment on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetia Conflict, supra note
215.
219. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 240; see generally The Agree-
ment on the Further Development on the Process of the Peaceful Regulation
of the Georgia-Ossetian Conflict and on the Joint Control Commission, supra
note 215; The Memorandum on Necessary Measures to be Undertaken in
Order to Ensure Security and Strengthening of Mutual Trust between the
Parties to the Georgian-Ossetia Conflict, supra note 215.
220. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 291; Agreement on a ceasefire
and separation of forces, May 14, 1994 reprinted in TAMAZ DIASAMIDZE,
2020] Functional Statehood in Contemporary Int'l Law 89
IIFFMCG interpreted the agreement to be an acceptance that
Article 2(4) applied to any conflict with South Ossetia or Ab-
khazia. 221
While this view holds that state-like entities might benefit
from the protection against the use of force, the corollary ques-
tion is whether the prohibition on the use of force prohibits
these entities from using force themselves.222 Again, historical-
ly this view has some precedent. North Korea was not widely
understood to be a state in 1950; when the UN Security Coun-
cil took action, it did so on the basis of the vague notion that
there had been a “breach of the peace”, though not an Article
2(4) violation, necessarily.223 By 2013, however, North Korean
threats have been articulated as violations of Article 2(4),224
notwithstanding the fact that North Korea is still not recog-
nized as a state by South Korea and Japan.225 The IIFFMCG
REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA (THE AUTONOMOUS OBLAST OF SOUTH
OSSETIA, THE AUTONOMOUS SSR OF ABKHAZIA 1989-2008): THE COLLECTION OF
POLITICAL-LEGAL ACTS 179–81 (2nd ed., 2008); Declaration on Measures for a
Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, Apr. 4, 1994 reprinted
in id. at 175; Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and
displaced persons, reprinted in id. at 172–74.
221. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 240, 291; S.C. Res. 876, ¶¶ 2, 4
(Oct. 19, 1993) (UNSC “demands that all parties refrain from the use of force”
and condemns violations of the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and
forces in Abkhazia); S.C. Res. 1187, ¶ 11 (1998) (UNSC “calls upon the par-
ties …to refrain from the use of force”); S.C. Res. 1494, ¶ 19 (July 30, 2003);
S.C. Res. 1524, ¶ 22 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1554, ¶ 22 (July 29, 2004); S.C.
Res. 1582, ¶ 24 (Jan. 28, 2005); S.C. Res. 1615, ¶ 25 (July 29, 2005).
222. See Nicholas Tsagourias, Non-state Actors in International Peace and
Security: Non-state Actors and the Use of Force, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (Jean D’Aspremont ed., 2011); Colin Warbrick,
States and Recognition in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 205–56
(Malcolm Evans ed., 2003).
223. See CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 470; S.C. Res. 82 (June 25, 1950); S.C.
Res. 83 (June 27, 1950); S.C. Res. 84 (July 7, 1950).
224. See Tom Miles, North Korea threatens South with “final destruction”,
REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:46 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/19/us-nkorea-threat-
idUSBRE91I0J520130219 (reporting on the threat of North Korea against
South Korea of a “final destruction” at the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament in 2013 and the reactions of the governments of South Korea,
France, Germany, Spain Poland US and Britain that the threat was a breach
of article 2(4)).
225. See Amended 1952 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (July, 7 1952) (S. Kor.) (defining the Republic of Korea
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took a similar approach when it found that the use of force by
South Ossetia was unlawful.226 The IFFMCG considered that,
even where an entity has a right to self-determination, that
right does not give rise to a right to use force in an attempt to
secede, excepting cases of de-colonialization or illegal occupa-
tion.227 Whether a state would in turn have a right to self-
defense from a quasi-state using force remains an open ques-
tion.228
In addition to the jus ad bellum, there is also the jus in bello.
This field of law originally only applied to international armed
conflict; that is, conflict between states. However, as some non-
state actors grew in military capability, and conflicts within
states evolved from police to military action, international hu-
as the entire Korean peninsula); Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan
and the Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965, Japan-Korea, art. III, June 22,
1965, T.S. No. 8473. Joyakushu Shouwa 40 (Nikokukan) 237-392, 2 JAPAN’S
FOREIGN RELATIONS-BASIC DOCUMENTS 569-572 (“It is confirmed that the
Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea
as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assem-
bly.”).
226. See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 279.
227. See id. See also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 68–72 (4th ed., 2018); but see G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
228. See Armed Acts. on the Terr. of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Ugan-
da), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 147. (Dec. 19) (refusing to address the
question); [id. (separate opinion by Judge Kooijmans); id. (separate opinion
by Judge Simma); id. (separate opinion by Judge Koroma) (discussing right to
self-defense of a non-state); Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136; S.C.
Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); HCJ 769/02 Publ.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel & Others v. Gov’t of Israel & Others (2005)
(Isr.); IIFFMCG Report, supra note 72, at 241–42; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 204–08, 247 (4th ed., 2005). See generally
Christian J Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 359
(2009); Kimberley N Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality and the
Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 141, (2007). See also Letter dated 7 June 2016 from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of Belgium [Bénédicte Frankinet, Amb.] to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/523
(June 6, 2016) (claiming that Belgium was taking collective self-defense
measures under art. 51 against ISIL, a non-state actor exercising effective
control over territory) (citing S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015)); Letter dated 10
December 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. [Heiko Thoms] of the Perma-
nent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015) (claiming that
Germany was taking identical measures against ISIL).
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manitarian law expanded to apply to quasi-states or entities
short of statehood.229 Certainly international humanitarian law
pertaining to non-international armed conflict applies to non-
state actors, but where the non-state entity is an NLM, it will
be bound by the rules on “international” armed conflict.230 In
any event, a quasi-state, though unrecognized as a state, must
comply with international humanitarian law.
8. Immunity
This next section will briefly observe how issues of immunity
can arise in cases of quasi-states. Lack of recognition can be an
impediment to lawsuit, since the entity has no personality in
the domestic legal order. However, courts are sometimes will-
ing to go behind the political posture and identify the real
facts.231 Conversely, an entity might be recognized as a person
but not as a state entitled to immunity.232 There is also the
practice of sometimes permitting the executive to certify that
an entity is a “state,”233 regardless of whether it has been rec-
229. See Jean S. Pictet, (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
Commentary, Volume 1, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva, 1952).
230. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgment, ¶¶ 115–46 (July 15, 1999); Christopher Greenwood, International
Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1 YB INT’L
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 7 (1998) (“[I]t is at least arguable that, under custom-
ary law, is not a precondition distance of international conflict that all parties
must be states, although it is necessary that they possess some kind of inter-
national status, at least de facto.”); OPPENHEIM, supra note 41, at 203–04.
231. See Limbin Hteik Tin Lat v. Burma, Shō 28 (yo) no. 9952, 5 Kakyū sai-
bansho minji saiban reishū [Kaminshū] 836 (Japan) (Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho
[Dist. Ct., Tokyo], June 9, 1954) translated at 32 INT’L L. REPS. 124.
232. See SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS EDS., 1 OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158–59 (9th ed. 1992).
233. See State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-18 (Can.) (“[A] certificate
issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs . . . with respect to … whether a
country is a foreign state for the purposes of this Act . . . is admissible in evi-
dence as conclusive proof of any matter stated in the certificate with respect
to that question.”); State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (U.K.) (“[A] certificate by
or on behalf of the Secretary of States shall be conclusive evidence on any
question . . . whether any country is a State for the purposes of Part I of this
Act”).
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ognized or not. 234 Similarly, the UN State Immunity Conven-
tion can be applied regardless of recognition.235 Thus, once
again, one sees that an entity not widely understood to be a
state might benefit from a partial, functional, recognition as a
state.
9. Recognition of a Contribution to Forming Customary Inter-
national Law
Yet another way in which state-like entities may be partially
or functionally recognized as states is for purposes of contrib-
uting their practice and opinio juris to customary international
law. Notwithstanding the submissions of some scholars that
customary international law may be formed by international
organizations,236 customary international law is generally un-
234. See Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 60 (Feb.
4, 1982)
There could be situations in which, for policy reasons, the
Secretary of State for External Affairs might wish to issue a
certificate stating that country x, although not recognized, is
a foreign state for the purposes of the act . . . . So if you were
to include as a requirement that the certificate should deal
with the question of recognition, that could restrict the po-
litical discretion in this area.
235. See Inst. Int’l L., Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Exe-
cution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law, art. 12
(2001) reprinted at 69 ANN. INST. DROIT INT’L 750 (2000-01) (“[T]his Resolu-
tion is without prejudice to the effect of recognition or non-recognition of a
foreign State or government on the application of its provisions”). But see
Worster, supra note 54 (arguing that international organizations do contrib-
ute to customary international law in certain situations such as “internal”
acts and cases where the organization exercises delegated state authority or
an international territorial administration).
236. All of the foregoing sets aside the contemporary argument that the
practice and opinio juris of international organizations in their own inde-
pendent capacity (and not expressing the practice of states by and through
international organizations) as evidentiary of customary international law.
See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 25 (May 28) (con-
sidering the depositary practice of the UNSG); Daphna Shraga, UN Peace-
keeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 408 (2000);
Kenneth S. Gallant, International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public
International Law: New Roles for International Organizations and Individu-
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derstood to be the practice and opinio juris of states.237 But
there are now a few places where non-states can contribute and
some scholars are less categorical about the exclusion of non-
states.238 Initially, perhaps it is important to observe that this
als, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 603 (2010) (setting aside the argument that the
practice and opinio juris (if we can speak of such a thing) of the ICRC can
contribute to the formation of CIL); See, e.g., Letter from US Dep’t of State,
Initial Response of U.S. to ICRC Study on Customary International Humani-
tarian Law with Illustrative Comments (Nov. 3, 2006) reprinted in DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sally J. Cummins, ed., 2007)
(“the [ICRC] Study gives undue weight to statements by non-governmental
organizations and the ICRC itself, when those statements do not reflect
whether a particular rule constitutes customary international law accepted
by States.”).
237. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur on Identification of Customary
International Law), Second Rep. on Identification of Customary International
Law, ¶¶ 34–36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“[I]t is primarily the
practice of States that contributes to the creation, or expression, of rules of
customary international law.”); See Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.)
International Law, Final Report of the Committee Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 69
INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 729 (2000) (“Although international courts and tri-
bunals ultimately derive their authority from States, it is not appropriate to
regard their decisions as a form of State practice.”); William Thomas Worster,
The Inductive and Deductive Methods in Customary International Law Anal-
ysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches, 45 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 445,
484 (2014); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International
Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 135, 144 (2007) (“What is remarkable
in this literature is that virtually all of it has accepted the core premise that
only states can form CIL”); Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Cus-
tomary International Law and Treaties, 322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243, 267
(2006) (“[States] have a quasimonopoly over the formation of custom …
[I]nternational judicial bodies — not being the organs of any single State —
never contribute as such to the practice of States”); Michael Reisman, The
Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes and
the Differentiation of Their Application, in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM & VOLKER
RUBEN EDS., DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 19–24
(2005) (observing non-state participation in forming customary international
law).
238. See Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction Between Customary International
Law and Treaties, 322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243, 267 (2006); Michael Reisman,
The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes
and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 28–29 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker
Röben eds., 2005)(“Because the question of whether international law will be
effective in a particular dispute will increasingly depend upon the arena or
forum in which the dispute is heard, scholarly and practitioner statements of
what the law is … will increasingly have to be qualified by reference to where
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is not a discussion of the relative weight of practice of certain
“specially interested”239 states. In that argument, the relative
interests of different states influence the weight of their prac-
tice in forming customary international law.240 This discussion
focuses on whether state-like entities, with a relative personal-
ity, can make any contribution at all. The ICJ and Internation-
al Law Commission have held that the practice of an interna-
tional organization—specifically the United Nations Secretari-
at—could contribute to customary international law in the nar-
row category of the organization’s functions.241 This is distinct
from the role of international organization acts as evidence of
customary international law,242 since here we are discussing
the legal act of creating international law. Sir Michael Wood, in
a potential dispute in the future may be initially characterized in terms of
law and where those characterizations will thereafter be put to political
use.”).
239. SeeWorster, supra note 237, at 497–98.
240. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20)(explaining that states that are especially
invested in an issue play a larger role in creating the relevant customary in-
ternational law than do states that are disengaged); Michael Byers, Introduc-
tion: Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 81–2, 84 (2001) (explaining that powerful states can play an out-
sized role). See generally William Thomas Worster, The Transformation of
Quantity to Quality: Critical Mass in the Formation of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 31 BOSTON UNIV. INT’L L.J. 62 (2013).
241. See Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
242. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, para. 70 (July 8) (“General Assembly resolutions . . .
can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris”); Military & Paramili-
tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J., ¶¶ 188, 190–92, 195, 202, 204 (June 27); North Sea Cont. Shelf (Ger.
v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 33–6 (Feb. 20); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 495 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For
Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998) (citing an ICJ decision to find that the Genocide Con-
vention reflects customary international law); Panel Report, Korea –
Measures Affecting Government Procurement, para. 7.123, WTO Doc.
WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000) (“Since this article has been derived largely from
the case law of the . . . PCIJ and the ICJ, there can be little doubt that it
presently represents customary international law . . . .”); Sedco, Inc. v. Nat’l
Iranian Oil Co. (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., 1986) reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 633; Kuwait
v. Am. Indep. Oil Co. (ad hoc arb. Trib., 1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 976,
1032-33; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya (U.S. v. Libya) Award, ¶ 78
(ad hoc arb. Trib., 1977) reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 30.
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his reports to the International Law Commission as Special
Rapporteur on the Formation of Customary International Law,
has concluded that the European Union would also contribute
to customary international law where it acts as a state-like en-
tity.243 The ILC has previously cited to the practice of quasi-
states for evidence of customary international law.244 Similarly,
this author has consulted practice and concluded that when an
international organization, usually the UN, governs through an
international territory administration, such as UNMIK,
UNTAET, UNTAES, and others, its practice has been consid-
ered to contribute to customary international law.245 In addi-
tion, the practice of non-state actors is certainly relevant in the
field of international humanitarian law,246 as noted above, and
the practice of the Holy See is often examined,247 even though
not a state. Thus, there is considerable existing practice of qua-
si-states or functional state-like governance entities contrib-
uting to customary international law.
243. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur on Identification of Customary
International Law), Second Rep. on Identification of Customary International
Law, ¶44 n. 135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014).
244. For citations to the practice of the Saar as if it was a state, see Roberto
Cordova (Special Rapporteur on the Elimination or Reduction of Stateless-
ness), Rep. on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/64 (Mar. 30, 1953); Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on State Re-
sponsibility), Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 &
Add.l, II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 111 (1972), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1; Ivan S. Kerno (Expert of the Int’l L. Comm’n),
Nationality, including Statelessness – Analysis of Changes in Nationality Leg-
islation of States since 1930, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/67, 2, 4–5 (Apr. 6, 1953). For
citations to the practice of the Free City of Danzig as if it was a state, see
U.N. Secretariat, Digest of Decisions of National Courts Relating to Succes-
sion of States and Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/157, II Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 97 (1963), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963/Add.1; Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep.
on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/9010/Rev.1, II Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n (1973).
245. See Worster, supra note 54 (arguing that one exception to disregarding
international organization practice for the formation of customary interna-
tional law is when an international organization is administering a territory
as its effective government, i.e. through a functional analysis).
246. See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate
Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitar-
ian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 126–32 (2012).
247. See Worster, supra note 237, at 484; Alain Pellet, Special Rapp., Int’l
L. Comm’n, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/491,
para. 6 (Apr. 30, 1998).
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CONCLUSION
This article questioned the standard legal view that state-
hood is an objective phenomenon. If the cases of subjective
statehood were isolated and truly sui generis, then that posi-
tion might hold, but many proliferating cases, across all parts
of the world, argue against that position. At some point the
tired label of sui generis becomes so common that it stretches
credulity.
Politics has taken over where the law is stumbling and states
simply treat these entities as if they were states to solve their
pragmatic needs. They are all being dealt with in the same
way: via a functional analysis. If a territorial entity is operat-
ing as if it were a state, then a de facto statehood status is ap-
plied to it insofar as it functions as such. Because legal person-
ality should flow from rights and duties, then the limited, func-
tional rights and duties suggest limited personality—i.e., func-
tional statehood. Subjective legal personality is now increasing-
ly the norm as a solution to a wide variety of situations in
many regions of the globe.
The widespread practice of engaging with questionable enti-
ties as states for some purposes and not for others is building a
regime of second-class, quasi-statehood. This quasi-statehood
practice measures international personality in much the same
way as the personality of non-state actors is measured: by func-
tionality. This practice then leads to the strange result that
statehood, at least for quasi-state entities, is a functional per-
sonality. The next step is to bring this doctrine into the law
more fully by developing standards for assessing functions to
provide greater legal clarity.
However, if it is conceded that statehood can, in this very lim-
ited way, be reduced to a partial consideration of functional
personality, then what impact on the statehood of the states
whose status is not in question? Does this growing practice of
quasi-statehood, and the selective refusal and acceptance of
certain entities as states lead to an understanding that all
statehood is a functional and relative phenomenon? This prob-
lem is the classic distinction between essential and existential
thought: whether an entity exists as such because of its inher-
ent character or because it interacts with others.248 Some psy-
248. See generally Susan A. Gelman & Gil Diesendruck, A Reconsideration
of Concepts: On the Compatibility of Psychological Essentialism and Context
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chologists have suggested that essentialist thought is only used
because it is a useful, perhaps evolved construct,249 suggesting
that it does not reflect reality, but rather a means of dealing
with reality. With an essentialist view, the object would have
qualities that are caused by some underlying essential charac-
teristics.250 An existential view, on the other hand, would not
merely treat an entity as if it were a state when it behaves as if
it were a state, but it would actually consider an entity to be a
state if it behaves as a state with other international actors.
This article has not gone so far. It has only concluded that
some entities exist that are treated as if they were states for
certain purposes, and that international law is flexible enough
to accommodate this practice. It may even be showing the nas-
Sensitivity, in CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: PIAGET’S LEGACY 79 (Ellin Kofsky
Scholnick, Katherine Nelson, Susan A. Gelman & Patricia H. Miller ed.,
1999); Susan A. Gelman & Lawrence A. Hirschfeld, How Biological is Essen-
tialism?, in FOLK BIOLOGY 403 (S. Atran & D. Medin ed., 1999); Susan A.
Gelman, John D. Coley & Gail M. Gottfried, Essentialist Beliefs in Children:
The Acquisition of Concepts and Theories, in MAPPING THE MIND: DOMAIN
SPECIFICITY IN COGNITION AND CULTURE, 341 (Lawrence A. Hirschfeld & Susan
A. Gelman ed., 1994); Frank C. Keil, The Birth and Nurturance of Concepts
by Domains: The Origins of Concepts of Living Things, in MAPPING THE MIND,
252, 234; FRANK C. KEIL, CONCEPTS, KINDS, AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
(1989); Douglas L. Medin, Concepts and Conceptual Structure, in 44 AM.
PSYCHOL., 1469 (1989); Douglas Medin & Andrew Ortony, Psychological Es-
sentialism, in SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING, 179 (Stella Vosniadou
& Andrew Ortony, eds. 1989).
249. See generally Scott Atran, Folk biology and the anthropology of science:
Cognitive universals and cultural particulars, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 547
(1998); Frank C. Keil, The growth of causal understandings of natural kinds,
in CAUSAL COGNITION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DEBATE (D. Sperber, D. Premack
& A. Premack ed., 1995); Scott Atran, Core domains versus scientific theories,
in MAPPING THE MIND: DOMAIN SPECIFICITY IN COGNITION AND CULTURE (Law-
rence A. Hirschfeld & Susan A. Gelman, eds. 1994); Frank C. Keil, The birth
and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts of living
things, in MAPPING THE MIND: DOMAIN SPECIFICITY IN COGNITION AND CULTURE
(Lawrence A. Hirschfeld & Susan A. Gelman, eds. 1994); D. Sperber, The
modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations, in MAPPING
THE MIND: DOMAIN SPECIFICITY IN COGNITION AND CULTURE (Lawrence A.
Hirschfeld & Susan A. Gelman, eds. 1994); Susan A. Gelman & Henry M.
Wellman, Insides and Essences: Early Understandings of the Nonobvious, in
38 COGNITION, 213–44 (1991).
250. See Michael Strevens, The Essentialist Aspects of Naïve Theories, in 74
COGNITION, 149–175 (2000); see generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (6th ed. 1995).
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cent signs of coalescing into a consistent doctrine. In turn, it
necessarily forces the question of whether objective statehood
will continue. But whether this practice suggests that all states
are necessarily relative is an argument for another day.
